SoutH2: five countries signed in Algiers. What remains: the price, the volumes, the construction.

Sofia Bouzid — Alger, Algérie — 2026-10-08

Where the project stands, in three phases.

We report the state of progress, not the promise. What is signed is signed; what remains to come, we say so as well — and the reader will know, at every stage, where their country stands.

Method note. This investigation does not seek to pour cold water on a project: it seeks to establish where that project stands. Every figure carries its source, named and dated. We separate what is DOCUMENTED, what is REPORTED, and what WE THINK of it. And we concede, from the outset, what this project has that matters.

What the European Union has really decided — and it is a great deal

The SoutH2 Corridor is not an Algerian announcement. It is a European project, officially inscribed.

It rests on four projects recognised by the Commission:

To which is added a Project of Mutual Interest (PMI): the “North-Africa H2-Backbone”, an offshore section Cap Bon (Tunisia) – Mazara del Vallo (Sicily), carried by SeaCorridor, the joint venture of Eni and Snam.

These projects appear in the 2nd list of projects of common and mutual interest, under delegated regulation (EU) 2026/764, adopted on 1 December 2025 and entered into force on 29 April 2026.

The project announces: about 3,300 kilometres, an import capacity of 4 million tonnes of hydrogen per year, and more than 65% of pipelines reused.

And on 1 October 2026, Algiers hosted the signature of the Algiers Ministerial Declaration — Algeria, Tunisia, Italy, Austria, Germany — with the creation of a technical secretariat and the support of ONUDI.

That is what is established. It is considerable, and we do not play it down: an Arab, African and Mediterranean capital brings together five States around a forward-looking energy project.

What does not exist — and yet is presented as settled

Let us now check what is missing. And here we must be precise, because this is where narratives part company with facts.

1. No final investment decision. As of 8 October 2026, no FID has been announced for SoutH2 or for any of its components. Several analyses state it explicitly: the corridor remains “a project in development, not a secured commercial hydrogen corridor”.

2. No quantified commitment in the Algiers Declaration. The text signed on 1 October contains neither a funding commitment nor a volumes commitment. It is written by the press that covered it.

3. The Rome declaration of January 2025 committed nothing either: no construction, no guaranteed purchase.

4. The first results of the feasibility study for the integrated Algerian project — “ALTEH2A” — are announced for 2027.

5. And the only overall cost figure in circulation — 13 billion euros — rests on a single source, itself citing an article we take as reported. No consolidated official estimate — from the Commission, from the network operators, or from Sonatrach — has been published.

The proof, in two columns

Two errors, two opposite consequences: one exaggerates the project (a construction decision that does not exist), the other plays it down (a Swiss refusal attributed to a project that is not its own). Both are corrected with the same documents.

The figures the parties themselves cannot agree on

This is not the press here: these are the project's own actors.

We do not settle these gaps: we publish them. A project that needs 13 billion euros cannot let its own partners diverge by 90% on an investment figure without anyone asking the question.

What Algeria has actually built — and what it lacks

What we have, and what is documented:

• October 2024, Oran: the “ALTEH2A” MoU — Sonatrach and Sonelgaz with VNG (Germany), Snam and SeaCorridor (Italy), Verbund Green Hydrogen (Austria): feasibility studies for an integrated production and export project.
• 19 June 2026: a new VNG–Sonatrach MoU on the green hydrogen supply chain, including examination of the conversion of Algerian gas pipelines.
• July 2026, Berlin: Robert Bosch (electrolysers and production) and Siemens Energy (maintenance, training, compression, green steel and ammonia).
• National objective: 1 million tonnes per year for export in 2040, for an announced investment of 25 billion dollars, that is an ambition of 10% of European renewable hydrogen demand (roadmap of March 2023).

What is missing, and must be said: a committed buyer, completed financing, and an investment decision. Protocols and intentions do not replace a contract.

And it is not our opponents who say so — it is Algerian experts themselves, who speak of prohibitive costs and an export market “not yet well established”. We prefer that it be written on our side.

The warning that must be read, and the one that must not be over-interpreted

The most serious signal comes from a European State that is not part of the project. The Swiss Federal Council refused to finance Transitgas, citing the “high supply risks of North African exporters such as Algeria and Tunisia”.

That is an argument that targets us directly — and it does not concern SoutH2. To cite it as proof of the corridor's failure would be dishonest. Not to read it at all would be naive. Here is the problem it raises, and it is real: the day European investors have to commit billions, the question they will ask will not be “is the project beautiful?” but “will Algeria deliver, whatever happens?”.

And a European regulator — ACER — summed up the doubt in a formula that deserves to be known: hydrogen projects belong more to “aspirations than to concrete market needs”. 70 European NGOs asked, on 23 March 2026, for their financing to be blocked; the European Parliament rejected that request on 26 and 27 March 2026.

And now, the mistake we refuse to make

This morning, we published a SCOOP against the Moroccan press, which announced an autonomy “sealed” on the basis of a UN report that settles nothing.

**The same failing exists on our side. It reads: *“the corridor is signed, Algeria becomes Europe's supplier, Morocco's hopes collapse.”***

That is a sentence that turns against you. The day an investor asks “where is the FID?”, the person who wrote that will have to answer “it does not exist” — and he will have lost the credibility to defend the project, which is real and worth defending.

SoutH2 does not need to be exaggerated: it needs to be financed. Our role is not to announce a victory, it is to say exactly what remains to be won — so that it can be won.

That is where the dossier stands, as of 8 October 2026, documents in hand.

Main sources: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/764, 2nd list of projects of common and mutual interest (TEN-E) — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202600764. — SoutH2 Corridor, official site of the initiative — https://www.south2corridor.net/initiative/. — bayernets, press release of 1 December 2025. — Snam, press release of November 2023 (6th PCI list) and CEF co-financing agreement of €24 m of 2 June 2025. — TAG, press release of 28 November 2023. — Radio Algérienne, 1 October 2026 (Algiers Ministerial Declaration) and 26 June 2025 (hydrogen strategy: 1 Mt/year in 2040, 25 bn USD). — Enerdata, 1 July 2025. — ENTV, 19 July 2026 (Bosch and Siemens Energy protocols). — VNG, 19 June 2026. — afrik.com, 1 October 2026 (“the SoutH2 corridor stumbles over value sharing”; absence of quantified commitments). — Maghreb Insider, 1 October 2026 (absence of FID; scope of the Rome declaration of 21 January 2025). — Green Building Africa, 6 March 2026. — Euronext, admission document of 5 July 2026. — junge Welt, 21 July 2026. — Pipeline Technology Journal, 8 October 2026 and 16 September 2026. — ACER, cited by Food & Water Action Europe, 23 March 2026 (70 NGOs). — Fuel Cells Works, 27 March 2026 (rejection by the European Parliament). — Global Energy Monitor, SoutH2 Pipeline profile.

⚠️ Reservations to be kept online. (1) The overall cost of 13 billion euros comes from a single source, itself citing an article we take as reported: we never give it as established. (2) The official PDFs — regulation 2026/764, Algeria's hydrogen strategy, Snam's written answers — are cited through identified reprints; their content is given on that basis, and flagged as such. (3) The narratives of “victory” and “defeat” attributed to the Algerian and Moroccan press are interpretations: we report them as such, without adopting them.