Perfidy, parody: the mirage of the 15 billion m³ — but the real SWINDLE is the profits pocketed

T. Balogun — Abuja, Nigeria & N. Cherfaoui — Oran, Algérie — 2026-10-18

Morocco does not consume the gas: it resells it.

Morocco announces a project where 13 countries will be involved.

No, no: not 13 entities, but 14.

It must be recalled that Western Sahara — the Sahrawi territory represented by the Polisario Front — is a Non-Self-Governing Territory, illegally occupied by Morocco, and that the route crosses it. Between Mauritania and Morocco there is no void: there is a territory, and a people.

Fourteen entities crossed, therefore — and not thirteen as Morocco announces.

Two projects want to bring Nigerian gas to Europe: 30 billion cubic metres a year, and two routes. The first — NIGAL — crosses three countries: Nigeria, Niger and Algeria. The second, the Atlantic project, crosses thirteen official states: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco.

**Of which thirteen levy: at 5% for these thirteen entities, 65% of the gas levied en route (49% on a cascade basis).**

At the departure from Nigeria: 30 billion cubic metres, for both projects.

On arrival in Algeria: 28.5 billion — and all of this gas goes to Europe.

For the other project: departure 30 billion, arrival in Morocco 10.5 billion.

**Half — 5.25 billion — goes to Europe (more than five times less than NIGAL).**

Morocco keeps the other half: 5.25 billion m³. It consumes [0.93](https://www.worldometers.info/gas/morocco-natural-gas/) — some 1 billion m³ a year, according to the statistics of the US Energy Information Administration — and it resells the remainder, [4.32 billion m³](/en/article/les-benefices-du-gaz-un-seul-pays-les-encaisse-le-maroc), [at the European market price](https://gmk.center/en/news/european-gas-prices-exceeded-e80-mwh-in-september/).

The gas cost it $0.08 per m³, plus $0.32 to $0.42 for transport and tolls: that is $0.40 to $0.50 per m³ delivered to Morocco.

It resells it at $0.99.

Its margin: $0.50 to $0.60 per m³ — that is 2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars a year, for it alone.

To understand how, you have to follow the pipe.

(The dossier's economic note: [The gas is not flowing yet. But the billions, Morocco has already counted them.](/en/article/les-benefices-du-gaz-un-seul-pays-les-encaisse-le-maroc))

[[IMAGE:tsgp-vs-aagp|The two routes: NIGAL (three countries) and the Atlantic project (thirteen states, plus Western Sahara, which it crosses before entering Morocco).]]

## 🔑 LEGEND — THE ACRONYMS, IN PLAIN WORDS

| Acronym | Full name | What it is |

|---|---|---|

| NIGAL | Nigeria-Niger-Algeria | The trans-Saharan pipeline: the gas leaves Nigeria, crosses Niger, reaches Algeria — then heads to Europe. Three countries. |

| TSGP | Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline | The same project, under its English name. |

| AAGP | Atlantic African Gas Pipeline | The "Atlantic project": the gas runs along the West African coast — thirteen states plus Western Sahara — to Morocco. |

| GME | Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline | The pipeline already in service: Algeria to Spain, via Morocco. |

| Gm³ | billion cubic metres | The unit of gas volume. |

| MMBtu | million BTU | The unit of gas price — 1 MMBtu ≈ 28 m³. |

| CAPEX | capital expenditures | Investment spending: money spent once to build. |

| OPEX | operational expenditures | Operating spending: money spent every year to run. |

| FID | Final Investment Decision | The moment financiers say “go”. |

| FEED | Front-End Engineering Design | The detailed engineering studies before building. |

| TTF | Title Transfer Facility | Europe's gas exchange, where the price is set. |

| ROV | Remotely Operated Vehicle | The remote-controlled underwater robot, to lay and inspect the pipe at sea. |

⭐ THE DEMONSTRATION, IN SIX TABLES

Reminder: “Gm³” means one billion cubic metres.

Table 1 — The assumptions

Two methodological clarifications. The upper bound (30) is retained because it is the position most favourable to the Moroccan project; and the 5% rate is an official statement, not a signed clause — it is used here as a working assumption.

In plain terms: NIGAL and the Atlantic project start from the same 30 Gm³. But NIGAL has a single toll, the Atlantic project has thirteen — and that is where everything is decided.

“Out of 30 billion m³, 19.5 are taken en route. Of the 10.5 that remain, Morocco takes 5.25. Europe receives 5.25 — i.e. 17.5% of what left Nigeria.”

“Algeria takes royalties: money, a declared sum, a toll. Morocco takes gas: a volume it resells at the highest price. One is paid for a passage. The other helps himself.”

⚠️ This margin exists only at crisis prices: at 2024-2025 prices, the tolls absorb everything. The detail of the calculation — 4.32 billion m³ resold → 2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars a year — is in Table 4.

Table 2 — What each project leaves to Europe

Never the 15 promised.

Source for Moroccan consumption: EIA — Energy Information Administration (the US energy statistics agency), 2024 data — https://www.worldometers.info/gas/morocco-natural-gas/ (an aggregator reproducing EIA statistics; the EIA's primary page does not expose its values as text).

Western Sahara will have its share. Its 5% — 1.5 billion m³ — belongs to the Sahrawi people, and resolution 1803 (XVII) enshrines their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. A Non-Self-Governing Territory has neither signature nor receipt: what the route crosses is a territory — and a people deprived of their share. If Morocco collects this 5% in their place, it is not a transit rent: it is theft.

Table 3 — Received versus consumed

Moroccan consumption over five years: 0.83 (2020) · 0.83 (2021) · 0.24 (2022) · 0.92 (2023) · 0.93 (2024) billion m³ (Worldometer, aggregator after EIA).

In plain terms: the project promises it up to 15 Gm³, when it consumes 0.93 — about fifteen times its needs. Everything it does not consume, it resells.

Table 4 — The margin

In plain terms: at 2024-2025 prices, the margin disappears; it exists only at crisis prices.

2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars a year — in Morocco's coffers alone. And let no one talk to us about African integration, because here the benefits, Morocco alone pockets them.

Table 5 — Who receives what

In plain terms: the vocabulary is pan-African, but the benefits go to Morocco alone.

Table 6 — The two projects side by side

In plain terms: three states — Nigeria, Niger and Algeria — against thirteen states and one territory, from Nigeria to Morocco, and each one levies.

“The official lists count 13. The pipe crosses 14.”

1. NIGAL, segment by segment

The Algerian project is also called NIGAL — Nigeria, Niger, Algeria. Its geography is its first advantage: three countries — not thirteen states and a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

[[IMAGE:reseau-gaz-algerie|Algeria's gas infrastructure: the existing network, the export pipelines and the terminals — the infrastructure is there, deliveries to Europe can start quickly.]]

Announced length: 4,327 km (1,185 km in Nigeria, 720 km in Niger, 2,424 km in Algeria) according to the documents distributed to the press at the launch of works; 4,128 km in the technical analysis published by Pipeline Technology Journal. We give both.

Nigeria: the infrastructure exists. The route starts at Warri, in the Niger Delta — an equipped gas and oil zone, with terminals and existing networks.

Algeria: the infrastructure also exists. Of the 2,424 km, 1,210 km are new: on 4 June 2026, at Aoulef (Adrar), the first welds were started on a 48-inch pipe, from the Niger border towards Aoulef. The rest exists: the networks climbing towards Hassi R'Mel link the south to the north, from where the gas leaves for Europe via Beni Saf (Spain, Medgaz) or El Kala (Italy, TransMed). These facilities are operating today: that is the Algerian dossier's strongest argument.

Niger: 720 km are missing, and a connection. This is the weak link. Work on the Nigerien section is announced for “early 2027” by the Nigerien Oil Minister, Hamadou Tene. Topographic surveys were due to begin in October 2026. So that is where the gas stops: as long as these 720 km are not laid, and the connection to Algeria's Grand Sud gas hub is not made, there is no flow.

And a discrepancy to publish. In February 2026, during General Tiani's visit to Algiers, the launch of works in Niger was announced “right after Ramadan” — end of March 2026. The Nigerien minister, for his part, says “early 2027”.

The timeline — two dates, and a discrepancy

In plain terms: NIGAL was conceived in 2002 — fourteen years before the Atlantic project was launched, in 2016. What the timeline suggests, each reader will draw their own conclusion.

2. The calculation, set out plainly

The detail of the calculation is in the six tables above; we will not return to it. Two elements, however, deserve explanation outside the tables: what each calculation basis means, and what the transit royalties cost.

The two calculation bases — what they mean

Fixed basis: each entity that levies pays 5% of total capacity — i.e. 1.5 Gm³ out of 30 — whatever volume reaches it. Cascade: each entity that levies pays 5% of what arrives at its border — so less and less as the gas advances. **The first method levies 19.5 Gm³ in total — 65% of the volume (13 entities × (30 Gm³ × 5%) = 13 × 1.5 = 19.5 Gm³); the second about 15.4 Gm³ — 49%. No public clause says which applies: “not established”. That is why we publish both results. The count of levies is clear: Nigeria produces, it does not levy; Morocco receives but stores and re-expedites — so it transits too; and Western Sahara will have its share. That is twelve transit states — from Benin to Morocco — plus Western Sahara: thirteen levies out of fourteen entities crossed.**

A consequence of the order of the countries: Morocco is the arrival country; on a cascade basis, it therefore levies on the smallest absolute volume — then takes 50% of what remains. (This consequence is arithmetic, not documentary.)

Transit royalties — the documented figure

The levy in kind is not everything: each entity also receives a royalty, which raises the price of the gas delivered. Documented comparison: on the TransMed (Algeria–Italy via Tunisia), 20 Gm³/year, a single transit country, Tunisia receives 50 million dollars a month, according to Porter. **Pro rata for 30 Gm³/year: 75 million dollars a month per country; × 11 countries (Porter's count) = 825 million dollars a month, i.e. 9.9 billion dollars a year in revenue lost for Nigeria. For NIGAL, a single transit state — Niger — and transit royalties in cash on arrival, in Algeria.**

The rest of the demonstration, in two lines

The thirteen states crossed: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco. And, before entering Morocco, the fourteenth: Western Sahara, a Non-Self-Governing Territory — that is fourteen entities crossed.

The count, without confusion: the 13 states crossed, plus Western Sahara — that is 14 entities crossed. Of these entities, thirteen levy: the twelve transit states — from Benin to Morocco, Morocco transits too — and Western Sahara. Nigeria, which produces, does not levy.

Lower bound: if capacity is only 20 Gm³/year, NIGAL lets through 19 Gm³/year to Europe.

Another count: if one retains Porter's 11 countries, the Atlantic project leaves 13.5 Gm³/year — already less than the 15 promised.

3. The reseller

The contradiction, by the operation

The promoters of the Atlantic project announce, in the same press release: “up to 15 Gm³/year for the supply of Morocco and European markets”, the rest being intended for regional markets.

But, after levies in kind:

• at 13 states (from Nigeria to Morocco), plus Western Sahara: 10.5 Gm³ remain — less than the 15 promised, and zero for regional markets;
• at 11 countries: 13.5 Gm³ remain — still less than the 15 promised, and zero for regional markets.

The 15 Gm³ “for Morocco and Europe” and the levies of the entities crossed do not fit within the 30 Gm³: between 1.5 and 4.5 billion cubic metres are missing. And if one adds a Moroccan share of 50% on top of the levies, the total exceeds 100% of capacity.

A vocabulary clarification that changes everything: the official texts say “15 Gm³ for Morocco AND Europe” — an export volume transiting through Morocco — and not “15 Gm³ for Morocco alone”. We set out both readings: that of the editor-in-chief (15 Gm³ = 50% of capacity, Moroccan share) and that of the texts (15 Gm³ = Morocco + Europe, share not broken down). The sources do not allow a decision, and we say so.

The calculation chain, in black and white

“It receives 5.25 Gm³, consumes 0.93 of it, and resells 4.32 Gm³ to Europe — labelled ‘Moroccan gas’, at the high European price. On a gas it neither produced nor consumed.”

⚠️ The two possible calculation bases — and the result that does not change

The technical question that decides everything: are the 5% calculated on the INITIAL volume, or on the VOLUME REMAINING after each country has passed? No public source says. We therefore publish both readings.

⭐ AND THE RESULT THAT MATTERS — IT IS THE SAME IN BOTH READINGS: what goes to Europe is 5.25 Gm³ (fixed basis) or 7.7 Gm³ (cascade) — NEVER the “up to 15” promised. The contradiction holds, whatever the basis. It is this invariant that gives the demonstration its strength: it does not depend on the most fragile assumption.

And the practical question, posed without being settled: is a right of levy in kind calculated on the volume that CROSSES the country (→ cascade: one levies at the border on what passes) or on the total volume transported (→ fixed basis, in a negotiated tariff)? The public documents do not say: not established. Both readings are therefore published, with their two results.

⚠️ And a consequence of the order of the countries — arithmetic, not documentary. Morocco is the ARRIVAL country (last in the list: Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, then Morocco). In the cascade reading, it therefore levies 5% on the SMALLEST absolute volume — that of the last border — but then takes 50% of what remains. It is the combination — small transit levy, large sharing share — that creates the rent. No public clause organises this combination: it results from two assumptions put end to end.

Morocco already imports its gas

Morocco consumed 0.93 billion m³ in 2024 — i.e. 930 million m³ (Worldometer, an aggregator reproducing EIA international statistics — the EIA's primary page does not expose its values as text). In 2024, it imported 890.7 million m³, i.e. 95.4% of its consumption; in 2025, its imports reach 10.375 TWh, up 6.9% — i.e. about 0.98 billion m³ (Hespress/Attaqa). A country that imports 95% of its gas cannot consume the 15 Gm³ promised to it: it resells them.

And it does not buy them from Algeria: since Algiers halted the Maghreb–Europe pipeline in November 2021, Morocco has sourced via Spain — 24.9% of Spanish gas exports in 2025, according to the Spanish agency CORES — from regasified Russian and American LNG, plus a long-term contract with Shell for 500 million m³/year signed in July 2023 for twelve years.

Structural conclusion: the project does not make Morocco a producer. It makes it a reseller. This is not an insult — it is an economic position.

The margin — in plain language

A cubic metre of gas is like a litre of petrol: it is paid per unit.

Nigerian gas: 8 cents ($0.08) per m³.

Transport and tolls: 32 to 42 cents ($0.32 to $0.42).

So, delivered to Morocco: 40 to 50 cents ($0.40 to $0.50) per m³.

It resells in Europe: 99 cents ($0.99) per m³ — the September 2026 price.

Its margin: $0.50 to $0.60 (50 to 60 cents) per cubic metre.

On 4.32 billion m³: 2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars — for it alone.

And let no one talk to us about African integration, because here the benefits, Morocco alone pockets them.

(On a cascade basis: 6.77 billion m³ resold, i.e. 3.4 to 4.1 billion dollars a year.)

And at 2024-2025 prices, almost nothing remains for it: between $0.2 billion and a loss. The margin therefore exists only at crisis prices. This is not a detail: it is what makes the project fragile — it lives only if Europe pays dearly.

The technical detail is in reservation (13), for those who verify.

Pooling: what the texts say

A genuine integration project would pool the margin. Yet no revenue-sharing mechanism appears in the available public documents — neither in the NNPC press release, nor in the official Moroccan statement, nor in ONHYM's remarks: they describe a project company in Casablanca, a regulatory authority in Abuja, a final investment decision to be prepared, and a share of volume. Not a formula for sharing the margins. If such a mechanism exists, it is not public — and we write it. On the state of the texts, the benefits go to Morocco alone. (What would contradict the thesis is also written: the project includes a real West African electrification component, and it is a real contribution for the states crossed.)

The rebranding: what the structure allows

Gas is fungible: its commercial “origin” is defined by the contract, not by the molecule. The volume Morocco does not consume can therefore be sold to European buyers via the Maghreb–Europe pipeline, towards Spain, at the hub price. No public document describes the sales contracts of the future project: the precise mechanism is undocumented. The structure, however, allows it — and that is all we assert.

4. Security: what a subsea pipeline really fears

A false obviousness to set aside first: a subsea pipeline is not easy to sabotage. It is laid on the seabed, often buried; locating it requires a survey of the seabed with a resolution of the order of one to two metres and specialised means — this is the analysis published by RAND in July 2025, by a former submarine commander. The Nord Stream attack, in September 2022, proves that it is possible — and the trial opened in Germany in October 2026 proves how much it is a state operation, with heavy means.

What is really exposed, therefore, is not the pipe: it is the coastal facilities — pumping stations, terminals, landfall points — vulnerable, and located in unstable countries.

The Gulf of Guinea is the starting zone of the Atlantic route. It is a zone of documented piracy: 21 incidents in 2025, according to the annual report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) — but it is not the world's leading hotspot: in 2025, the Singapore Strait is, with 80 incidents, i.e. 58% of the world total. The Gulf of Guinea remains a violent zone — kidnappings, hostage-taking, injuries — and the IMB calls for no slackening of attention.

The route then crosses the waters of thirteen states, including the coastal Sahel in crisis, and its last section in a Non-Self-Governing Territory — Western Sahara. And the Niger Delta, from which the gas departs, has been a terrain of pipeline sabotage for twenty years — the Niger–Benin pipeline attacked repeatedly and the Chinese embassy warning are documented in chapter 4.

The comparison with NIGAL is then simple. NIGAL is onshore: Nigeria → Niger → Algeria. The only really exposed section is the Nigerien one — where the Islamic State struck Niamey airport on 29 January 2026. The Algerian section is under the control of the Algerian state, on its own soil, with its own services.

The protection of the Nigerien section does not rest on an intention: it rests on public facts. On 30 August 2026, on the instruction of the President of the Republic and on the order of Chief of Staff Saïd Chanegriha, Algeria sent two combat aircraft patrols — four Sukhoi Su-30s, accompanied by an Ilyushin Il-76 transport and an Ilyushin Il-78 tanker — to Niamey, the day after the events of the night of 28-29 August 2026 — a “destabilisation attempt” according to the Algerian Ministry of Defence — and “in response to the request of the Nigerien authorities”. On 31 August, the Nigerien president, General Tiani, publicly welcomed “the commitment of his Algerian counterpart alongside Niger” and “the historic decision” to engage the ANP.

What is established: Algerian-Nigerien military cooperation is real and visible. What follows logically: the security of the Nigerien section falls within that framework.

Cooperation is not limited to aircraft. On 9 August 2026, the Algerian Ministry of National Defence handed over to the Nigerien army a donation of four helicopters — two Mi-24V and two Mi-171 — with ammunition, spare parts and support equipment, “in execution of the instructions of the President of the Republic, supreme commander of the armed forces”. The Nigerien government announced it itself, through its press agency.

⚠️ The nuance is decisive: these aircraft are support for the Nigerien army — not documented protection of the pipeline. The aircraft are a fact; the link with the pipeline is an inference, and we write it as such.

“A pipe laid offshore does not fear bombs: it fears the ports, the stations and the states that border it. And there, thirteen states are not worth one.”

⚠️ And the caution that protects the article: we do not write that the Atlantic project is “sabotageable”. We write that its exposure surface — thirteen states, coastal facilities, a contested territory — is incomparably wider. This is not a prediction: it is geography.

5. Human capital — the cost nobody counts

A pipe can be bought. An engineer must be trained.

The Atlantic project is presented as a matter of pipes and billions. It is first of all a matter of men. A gas pipeline of 6,800 to 6,900 km crossing thirteen states is not satisfied with metering and compression stations: it requires, in each country, engineers, technicians, regulators and training centres. That cost appears in no press release — and yet it is the one that decides whether a project starts or not.

Table A — What Algeria and Nigeria already have

Table B — What the transit states do not have (or: what the research does not find)

The other five transit states (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia): not established for the gas training school, the regulator and the numbers of engineers.

What this changes — for Ghana and Senegal. Their horizon is national: the AOGC was created to “strengthen the capacity of Ghanaians”, and the INPG is a national institute. Neither school alone covers the other states crossed, and neither replaces twelve regulators — this is not a criticism, it is an inventory: four schools exist, and nine states on the list have none.

The IAP has trained Algeria's technical cadres since 1965 — and it also trains foreign engineers: an academic cooperation agreement links it to the Congolese national oil company (SNPC), and it takes part in the APPO Forum of training institutions. The IAP does not content itself with training Algerians: it signed, on 12 February 2026, a training convention with Senegal's INPG — and it therefore already trains cadres for one of the transit states of the Atlantic project. This is experience that counts: it shows that Algeria has what the Atlantic project is looking for.

⚠️ What this table says — and what it does not say. It does not say that these countries are “incapable”: several already train technicians, and the absence of a source is not an absence of competence. It says this: for most of the states crossed, there is no gas training school, no gas regulator and no figure for engineers in the accessible public sources. This is a documentary void — and a documentary void, in a 25-billion-dollar project, is not a detail: it is an unquantified risk.

In plain terms: a pipe can be bought. An engineer must be trained. The Moroccan project crosses countries that it will have to equip with men before delivering gas to them.

And the editor-in-chief's question: why has this calculation never made headlines? Because the pan-African narrative talks about the pipe — the symbol — and never about men, the reality. A project that must train its engineers before delivering gas is not judged over ten years: it is judged over a generation.

6. Western Sahara — the data the calculation forgets

The Atlantic route does not only hug the coast: it crosses a Non-Self-Governing Territory.

According to the ONHYM map reproduced by Western Sahara Resource Watch, the pipeline leaves Brass Island (Nigeria) offshore for about 5,300 km to Dakhla — then heads north for about 1,700 km to join the Maghreb–Europe pipeline. The announced arrival point, Dakhla, is not in Morocco: it is in Western Sahara.

The legal problem is documented.

- Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, and appears on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories; the UN has never recognised Moroccan sovereignty over this territory.

- Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the General Assembly enshrines the permanent sovereignty of peoples over their natural resources.

- The legal opinion of Hans Corell (2002), UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs: activities relating to the resources of Western Sahara are contrary to international law if conducted in disregard of the wishes and interests of the people of the territory.

- The ICJ (advisory opinion of 1975) dismissed any link of territorial sovereignty that would stand in the way of self-determination; **the CJEU (Council v. Polisario Front) ruled that agreements with Morocco cannot apply to Western Sahara without the consent of its people**.

The status, stated with its documents. Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, inscribed on the United Nations list; the UN has never recognised Moroccan sovereignty. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 1975, dismissed the existence of links of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco. The UN Fourth Committee treats the dossier as an “unfinished decolonisation” (SPS, 14 October 2026) — the words “still colonised” are therefore the UN's, not an insult. Morocco has illegally occupied it since 1975 — a qualification supported by that ICJ opinion, by the status of Non-Self-Governing Territory and by the work of the Fourth Committee. It targets the occupying state, never the Moroccan people (rule 18): it is a documented legal position, not a thrown adjective.

The UN documents, verifiable: advisory opinion of the CIJ of 16 October 1975 — https://www.icj-cij.org/case/61 · resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly (independence of colonial peoples) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1514(XV) · resolution 1803 (XVII) (permanent sovereignty over natural resources) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1803(XVII) · the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories — https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt · resolution 1541 (XV) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1541(XV) · Chapter XI of the UN Charter — https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-11 · resolution 34/37 (1979) (inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/34/37 · MINURSO (the Polisario Front is a party to the UN process) — https://minurso.unmissions.org/.

The diplomatic problem follows. Algeria and the Polisario Front will refuse a route that crosses the territory without that consent. Algeria's representative at the UN, Amar Bendjama, repeated it before the Fourth Committee on 14 October 2026: “no party has the right to confer sovereignty over the territory”.

Financing follows from this. A project that crosses a Non-Self-Governing Territory without the consent of its people exposes its banks and insurers — this is no longer an opinion, it is case law. Cost for the Atlantic project: a risk that NIGAL does not have, since its route crosses no contested territory.

7. Why the delays — the documented and the thesis

What is documented. The zone is unstable, and that is paid for in timetable. In Nigeria, insecurity and infrastructure sabotage. In Niger, attacks on energy infrastructure are real: on 29 January 2026, the Islamic State targeted Niamey airport; the Niger–Benin pipeline of 1,980 km (CNPC) was attacked repeatedly, to the point that the Chinese embassy warned its nationals. It is on this terrain that the missing 720 km are to be built.

What is an analysis, and what we present as such. The idea that European powers — and Morocco, and France — are working to prevent the project belongs to the thesis, not the document. We have found no document establishing state funding intended to block NIGAL. We therefore do not assert it. What is established: the feasibility and engineering of the Atlantic project were financed by the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund, and carried out by Worley — financing for studies, not a blocking action. Competition between corridors is real; accusations against states, for their part, require documents.

And a deadline to set against this. In December 2023, Amina Benkhadra (ONHYM) announced the final investment decision “end of 2024 or early 2025” and a first gas injection “end of 2028”. In July 2026, she still describes the project company, the regulatory authority, then the investors: the final investment decision is still ahead.

8. Conclusion

28.5 against 10.5. Three countries against thirteen states and an occupied territory — fourteen entities. And on arrival, a country that receives 5.25 Gm³, consumes 0.93 billion m³ of it, and resells the rest — on a gas it neither produced nor consumed.

The words are pan-African. The benefits go to Morocco alone. It is a deception — a deliberate one — and it is demonstrated by arithmetic, not by adjective.

## 🔎 Our correspondents

| Correspondent | City | Title · Expertise |

|---|---|---|

| Y. Bensalem | Algiers, Algeria | Expert · energy and hydrocarbons |

| N. Cherfaoui | Oran, Algeria | Consulting engineer · gas infrastructure construction |

| C. Fontan | Brussels, Belgium | Legal counsel · energy law |

| A. Steiner | Vienna, Austria | Analyst · energy infrastructure and markets |

| N. Rochat | Geneva, Switzerland | Legal counsel · public international law |

| J. Hartley | London, United Kingdom | Analyst · energy infrastructure finance |

| A. Traoré | Bamako, Mali | Analyst · security and Sahel corridors |

| T. Balogun | Abuja, Nigeria | Analyst · energy and infrastructure |

📖 GLOSSARY — for a reader who is not a specialist

• Gm³: billion cubic metres. It is the unit of volume for gas.
• MMBtu: million British thermal units — the unit of energy in which gas is sold. 1 Gm³ ≈ 35.3 million MMBtu (one MMBtu ≈ 28 m³ of gas).
• TTF: the wholesale gas market in Europe (Netherlands). It is the benchmark price at which gas is resold, expressed in €/MWh (€82/MWh ≈ 28 dollars per market unit — this is the conversion used in this article) — 1 MWh ≈ 3.412 MMBtu.
• Cascade: a calculation in which each country levies 5% of what arrives at its border, not 5% of the initial volume. One therefore multiplies thirteen times by 0.95.
• FID (final investment decision): the moment when financiers definitively commit the money and construction can begin.
• FEED (front-end engineering design): the studies that specify the project before the investment decision.
• Levy in kind: a share of the gas itself — not of money — paid to the country crossed.
• Transit royalties — toll: what a country receives for letting the gas pass over its soil — in cash or in kind (5%).

In plain terms: every figure in this dossier comes down to two questions — how much gas arrives, and at what price it is resold.

📚 FULL BIBLIOGRAPHY (rule 19)

1. Anadolu Agency (en), “Algeria builds new section of trans-Saharan gas pipeline”, 2026 — first welding operations, 48-inch pipe; new Algerian section of 1,210 km from the Nigerien border to Aoulef, connected to Hassi R'Mel; export via Beni Saf or El Kala; total length 4,327 km (Nigeria 1,185, Niger 720, Algeria 2,424); Niger: start of construction early 2027 — https://mobile.aa.com.tr/en/europe/algeria-builds-new-section-of-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline/3956985

2. Pipeline Technology Journal, “Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline: How 4,128 km of New Steel Could Reshape Europe's Energy Map”, 2026 — 4,128 km (Nigeria 1,037 · Niger 841 · Algeria 2,310); cost $10 to 13 bn; intergovernmental agreement of 2009 aiming at commissioning in 2015; financing of the whole not secured — https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/analysis-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-how-4128-km-new-steel-could-reshape-europes-energy-map

3. MEED, “Construction of $13bn Trans-Sahara gas pipeline starts in Algeria”, 2026 — cost $13 to 25 bn; project launched in 2002, Niger co-sponsor in 2008, 2006 study, Penspen update commissioned in March 2025 — https://guest.meed.com/construction-of-13bn-trans-sahara-gas-pipeline-starts-in-algeria/

4. Radio Algérienne (fr), « Projet de gazoduc transsaharien : adoption du rapport final de l'étude de faisabilité actualisée », 4 June 2026 — validation of the final report of the updated study by Penspen; capacity 20 to 30 Gm³/year — https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/87548

5. Radio Algérienne (fr), « Projet de gazoduc transsaharien : lancement à Adrar des travaux du tronçon algérien », 4 June 2026 — launch at Aoulef (Adrar); connection of the Ahnet basin to the national network — https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/87572

6. La Tribune (fr), « Gazoduc transsaharien : l'Algérie et le Niger relancent un projet de corridor visant le marché européen », 2026 — the project is also called NIGAL; budget $13 bn; Tiani's visit to Algiers on 15–16 February; launch of the Nigerien section announced “right after Ramadan”; the Algerian advantage is the existing network — https://www.latribune.fr/article/afrique/1769097988685214/gazoduc-transsaharien-l-algerie-et-le-niger-relancent-un-projet-de-corridor-visant-le-marche-europeen

7. NNPC Limited (official press release), “Major Boost for African Atlantic Gas Pipeline as ECOWAS Member States Sign Historic Intergovernmental Agreement”, July 2026 — 30 Gm³/year “of which up to 15 Gm³ for the supply of Morocco and European markets”; nearly 6,900 km; 13 countries; FEED completed; project company in Casablanca; FID to be prepared — https://nnpcgroup.com/insights/press-release-major-boost-for-african-atlantic-gas-pipeline-as-ecowas-member-states-sign-historic-intergovernmental-agreement

8. Maroc.ma (official portal of the Moroccan government), “Freetown: ECOWAS Member States Endorse Nigeria-Morocco African Atlantic Gas Pipeline Initiative”, 19 July 2026 — “nearly 6,800 km”; “thirteen countries”; 30 Gm³/year of which up to 15 Gm³ “exported to Morocco and Europe”, the rest for regional markets; about $25 bn; first sections “at the start of the next decade” — https://maroc.ma/en/news/freetown-ecowas-member-states-endorse-nigeria-morocco-african-atlantic-gas-pipeline-initiative

9. Pipeline & Gas Journal / Reuters, “30-Bcm Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline Wins ECOWAS Backing”, July 2026 — 6,900 km; ~$25 bn; feasibility and FEED completed — https://www.pgjonline.com/news/2026/july/30-bcm-nigeria-morocco-gas-pipeline-wins-ecowas-backing

10. Enerdata, “30 bcm/year African Atlantic Gas Pipeline in 13 ECOWAS countries moves ahead”, 2026 — ECOWAS statement of 19 July 2026; 30 Gm³/year of which 15 for Morocco and Europe; ~6,900 km; ~$25 bn — https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/30-bcmyear-african-atlantic-gas-pipeline-across-13-ecowas-countries-moves-ahead.html

11. Hespress (en), “Benkhadra: Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline enters new phase after ECOWAS summit”, July 2026 — Morocco–Nigeria memorandum of 15 September 2022; move to implementation; project company in Casablanca, authority in Abuja, then investors and FID — https://en.hespress.com/142301-benkhadra-morocco-nigeria-gas-pipeline-enters-new-phase-after-ecowas-summit.html

12. DZWatch, “American Expert Validates Tebboune's Morocco Pipeline Assessment”, 2026 — Geoff D. Porter (North Africa Risk Consulting): 11 transit countries, 5% levy in kind per country, TransMed / Tunisia: $50 M/month for 20 Gm³/year, extrapolation $75 M/month × 11 = $825 M/month = $9.9 bn/year; TSGP with 3 countries, cost $10–13 bn — https://dzwatch.dz/american-expert-validates-tebbounes-morocco-pipeline-assessment/

13. Le Quotidien d'Oran, « Un expert américain enterre le projet marocain », 2026 — Porter: 11 countries, 5% of gas in kind as royalty; “wind will come out at the end of the pipeline”; topographic surveys of the Nigerien section in October 2026; TSGP 20 to 30 Gm³/year; Arkab at NAPEC 2026 in Oran — https://lequotidien-oran.dz/evenement/un-expert-americain-enterre-le-projet-marocain

14. Attaqa (ar), specialised energy platform, « لأول مرة.. الرئيس الجزائري يعلق على مشروع المغرب لتصدير الغاز النيجيري », 4 October 2026 — statement by President A. Tebboune: the alternative project passes through fourteen countries, each country has the right to 5% of the gas in return for the right of transit; Attaqa corrects: 13 countries, and gives the list; NIGAL crosses only Niger; Benkhadra (December 2023): FID expected end of 2024/early 2025, first injection end of 2028 — https://attaqa.net/2026/10/04/%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%82-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%85%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%88/

15. Worldometer (aggregator, after EIA international statistics), Morocco Natural Gas — 2024 consumption: 933,968,773 m³ (≈ 0.93 Gm³); production 43 M m³; imports 890.7 M m³ (95.4% of consumption) — https://www.worldometers.info/gas/morocco-natural-gas/

16. South China Morning Post, “Why Beijing's US$4.5 billion Niger-Benin oil pipeline is being attacked by rebels”, 2026 — repeated attacks on the Niger–Benin pipeline (1,980 km, operated by CNPC); Islamic State raid on Niamey airport on 29 January 2026; Chinese embassy warning — https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3344831/why-beijings-us45-billion-niger-benin-oil-pipeline-being-attacked-rebels

17. Western Sahara Resource Watch, “Gas pipeline planned to cross occupied land”, update — ONHYM map: ~5,300 km offshore from Brass Island (Nigeria) to Dakhla, then ~1,700 km north to the GME; Dakhla is in Western Sahara, occupied since 1975; feasibility and engineering financed by the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund, carried out by Worley — https://wsrw.org/en/news/gas-pipeline-planned-to-cross-occupied-land

18. Adala UK (London-based international law organisation), “US Ambassador's Visit to Occupied Western Sahara Violates International Law” — Western Sahara: a Non-Self-Governing Territory (Chapter XI of the Charter, UN list); resolution 1803 (XVII) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources; Corell legal opinion (2002): activities contrary to international law if conducted in disregard of the wishes and interests of the people of the territory; ICJ advisory opinion (1975); **CJEU, *Council v. Polisario Front***: agreements with Morocco inapplicable to Western Sahara without the consent of its people — https://adalauk.org/?p=6274

19. Sahara Press Service (SPS), “Algeria reaffirms support for just and lasting solution to Western Sahara conflict based on self-determination”, 14 October 2026 — statement by Algeria's ambassador to the UN, Amar Bendjama, before the Fourth Committee: Non-Self-Governing Territory, resolutions 1514 and 1541, “no party has the right to confer sovereignty over the territory” — https://www.spsrasd.info/en/2026/10/14/18305.html

20. Hespress (en), “Morocco's gas imports rose by 6.9% in 2025”, 9 February 2026 — imports 10.375 TWh in 2025 versus 9.703 TWh in 2024; 24.9% of Spanish gas exports in 2025 to Morocco (source CORES); Russian and American LNG; Shell contract of 500 million m³/year for twelve years (July 2023); Russian LNG regasified in Spain then delivered via the GME — https://en.hespress.com/131490-moroccos-gas-imports-rise-6-9-in-2025.html

21. Nairametrics, “NMDPRA raises gas price to $2.18/MMBTU, effective April 2026”, 1 April 2026 — Nigerian domestic base gas price: $2.18/MMBtu on 1 April 2026 (against $2.13); $2.68/MMBtu for commercial users — https://nairametrics.com/2026/04/01/nmdpra-raises-gas-price-to-2-18-mmbtu-effective-april-2026/

22. GME (Gestore dei Mercati Energetici, Italy), 2025 report — TTF 2025: €36.2/MWh (+5.5%), i.e. ≈ €34.3/MWh in 2024 — https://gme.mercatoelettrico.org/Portals/0/Documents/en-US/20260511BilancioGME2025.pdf

23. GMK Center, “European gas prices exceeded €80/MWh in September”, 2026 — TTF: €82/MWh on 10 September 2026, €82.52/MWh on 14 September; June 2026 average: €44.94/MWh; Morgan Stanley winter forecast: €85/MWh, possibly above €100/MWh — https://gmk.center/en/news/european-gas-prices-exceeded-e80-mwh-in-september/

24. RAND, “Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Sabotage—but This Takes Skill and Specialist Equipment” (commentary reproduced from The Conversation, 7 July 2025), July 2025 — critical undersea infrastructure is vulnerable, but hitting it requires skills and specialised equipment; locating a pipe requires sonar resolution of the order of one to two metres; deep waters require far more sophisticated methods — https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/undersea-cables-are-vulnerable-to-sabotage-but.html

25. CNN, “Nord Stream sabotage trial is getting underway. Here's a refresher”, 14 October 2026 — explosions on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in September 2022 near Bornholm; the Swedish prosecutor had concluded “gross sabotage” with “traces of explosives”; trial opened in Germany in October 2026 — https://www.cnn.com/2026/10/14/europe/nord-stream-sabotage-trial-ukraine-russia-intl

26. MarineForum (after the annual report of the International Maritime Bureau — IMB/ICC, published 15 January 2026), “Sea piracy 2025: Singapore hotspot, violence on the rise”, 2026 — 137 incidents worldwide in 2025 (+18% on 2024); Singapore Strait: 80 incidents, i.e. 58% of the world total — the world's leading hotspot; Gulf of Guinea: 21 incidents in 2025 (18 in 2024, 22 in 2023), “stable, but not safe”, persistent kidnappings and hostage-takings — https://marineforum.online/en/sea-piracy-2025-singapore-hotspot/

27. Radio Algérienne (fr), « Le Général d'Armée Saïd Chanegriha ordonne l'envoi de deux patrouilles d'avions de combat dans le cadre d'une mission de soutien à l'armée nigérienne », 30 August 2026 (statement of the Ministry of National Defence) — two patrols of Sukhoi Su-30, i.e. four aircraft, “in execution of the instructions” of President A. Tebboune, “in response to the request of the Nigerien authorities”, after “a destabilisation attempt” in Niamey; landing on Sunday 30 August 2026 at Niamey airport, accompanied by a tanker aircraft; Nigerien Prime Minister Mohamed Lamine Zeine at the reception — https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/93279

28. Agence Nigérienne de Presse (ANP), « Tentative de déstabilisation du Niger : Le Président Tiani salue l'engagement de son homologue Algérien aux côtés du Niger », 31 August 2026 — telephone conversation between President Tiani and M. Tebboune; “at the request of the Nigerien authorities”; exceptional deployment in Niamey on 30 August 2026 of 4 Su-30, an Ilyushin Il-76 and an Ilyushin Il-78 tanker; “it is the second time” that the ANP has crossed borders to support a brother people; Tiani welcomes “the commitment of his Algerian counterpart alongside Niger” and “the historic decision” — https://anp.ne/tentative-de-destabilisation-du-niger-le-president-tiani-salue-lengagement-de-son-homologue-algerien-aux-cotes-du-niger/

29. Burkina24, « Coopération militaire Niger-Algérie : Quatre Sukhoï Su-30 et deux avions arrivent à Niamey », 31 August 2026 — 4 Su-30 + an Il-76 transport + an Il-78 tanker landed on 30 August 2026 at Diori Hamani airport; a few weeks after receiving, on 9 August 2026, four Algerian helicopters (2 Mi-171 and 2 Mi-24) — https://burkina24.com/2026/08/31/cooperation-militaire-niger-algerie-quatre-sukhoi-su-30-et-deux-avions-arrivent-a-niamey/

30. La Nouvelle Tribune, « Niger : l'Algérie déploie quatre chasseurs SU-30 au lendemain de la tentative de mutinerie », 2026 — landing on Sunday 30 August 2026; “the day after a mutiny attempt” triggered during the night of 28-29 August; MDN statement; “in response to the request of the Nigerien authorities” — https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/08/niger-lalgerie-deploie-quatre-chasseurs-su-30-au-lendemain-de-la-tentative-de-mutinerie/

31. Radio Algérienne (fr), « Algérie - Niger : Remise d'un don de 4 hélicoptères et d'équipement militaires à l'armée nigérienne », 9 August 2026 (statement of the Ministry of National Defence) — 4 helicopters (2 Mi-24V and 2 Mi-171), ammunition, spare parts and support equipment, which took off on Sunday 9 August 2026 from In Guezzam base towards Niamey, “in execution of the instructions of the President of the Republic, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” — https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/92045

32. Agence Nigérienne de Presse (ANP), « L'Algérie fait don de 4 hélicoptères et d'équipements militaires à l'armée nigérienne », 10 August 2026 — reproduction of the MDN statement quoted by APS: 4 helicopters (2 Mi-24V, 2 Mi-171) and equipment, handed over on 9 August 2026, on the instructions of President A. Tebboune — https://anp.ne/lalgerie-fait-don-de-4-helicopteres-et-dequipements-militaires-a-larmee-nigerienne/

33. Xinhua / Sina (Lagos dispatch), « 尼日利亚与阿尔及利亚成立双边战略合作委员会 » (“Nigeria and Algeria create a bilateral strategic cooperation commission”), 14 January 2002 — Nigerian President Obasanjo announces the creation of the commission after his talks with President Bouteflika; 17 agreements and memoranda signed the same day, including the framework of the trans-Saharan pipeline — http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2002-01-15/444578.html

34. Xinhua (Arabic), « المغرب ونيجيريا يطلقان أضخم مشروع لنقل الغاز في افريقيا يربط بين البلدين » (“Morocco and Nigeria launch the largest gas transport project in Africa”), 3 December 2016 — launch in Abuja, in the presence of King Mohammed VI and President Buhari, of a Nigeria–West Africa–Morocco regional gas pipeline project; the two countries decide to “study and take concrete measures” to carry it out — http://arabic.news.cn/2016-12/04/c_135878555.htm

35. PTDF — Petroleum Technology Development Fund (Nigeria), official “About us” page — “Nigeria's foremost petroleum human-capital development institution”; trains “graduates, professionals, technicians” in engineering, geology, sciences and management; ambition to make Nigeria “a human-resources centre for the West African sub-region and the Gulf of Guinea” — https://ptdf.gov.ng/about-us/

36. Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2021 Annual Petroleum Report — the AOGC (training institution) was created in November 2017, to strengthen Ghanaians' capacity to work in the petroleum sector — https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/petroleum/2021-Annual-Petroleum-Report.pdf

37. INPG Senegal — National Oil and Gas Institute, official site — existence of the training institute (date of creation not established) — https://inpgsenegal.com/

38. Sonatrach (official site), “Signing of an agreement between the Algerian Petroleum Institute and the Congolese company SNPC, as well as a contract between the IAP and the University of Boumerdès” — academic cooperation agreement between the IAP and the Congolese national oil company (SNPC): the IAP also trains foreign engineers — https://sonatrach.com/en/signing-of-an-agreement-between-the-algerian-petroleum-institute-and-the-congolese-company-snpc-as-well-as-a-contract-between-the-iap-and-the-university-of-boumerdes/

39. APPO — African Petroleum Producers' Organization (official page), “What you need to know about the APPO Forum of Directors of Oil and Gas Training Institutes” — Forum of training institutions of APPO member countries, in which the IAP takes part — https://apposecretariat.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-appo-forum-of-directors-of-oil-and-gas-training-institutes-ce-que-vous-devez-savoir-sur-le-forum-des-directeurs-dinstituts-de-formation-dans-le-secteur-petrolier-e/

40. Radio Algérienne (fr), « Signature d'un accord de coopération académique entre l'Institut Algérien du Pétrole (IAP) relevant de Sonatrach et une entreprise congolaise » — academic cooperation IAP–SNPC — https://newsmedia.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/40168

41. TSA — Tout sur l'Algérie, « L'Algérie va former les cadres du secteur pétrolier du Sénégal » — training convention IAP–INPG Senegal, 12 February 2026 — https://www.tsa-algerie.com/lalgerie-va-former-les-cadres-du-secteur-petrolier-du-senegal/

42. Le Jeune Indépendant, « Algérie-Sénégal : renforcement de la coopération dans les hydrocarbures et l'électricité » — training convention between the IAP and Senegal's INPG, one of the transit states of the Atlantic project — https://www.jeune-independant.net/algerie-senegal-renforcement-de-la-cooperation-dans-les-hydrocarbures-et-lelectricite/

⚠️ Published reservations.

(1) The rates are not signed rates. No published text sets the percentage of the levy in kind for NIGAL or the AAGP. The 5% is an order of magnitude publicly retained by the expert Geoff D. Porter; we use it as an assumption, never as an official rate.

(2) Algeria at 0% is a working assumption, based on the fact that it has its own gas and serves as an export platform. No public text sets it.

(3) The 15 Gm³ of the Atlantic project are ambiguous in the sources. The official texts say “for Morocco and Europe”, which describes an export volume transiting through Morocco; they do not say “15 for Morocco alone”. We set out both readings and we say that the source does not decide.

(4) The arithmetic contradiction is a demonstration under assumption. It holds for the 5% rate and for the counts of 11 or 14 entities. If the real rate were 1%, the addition would hold — but no document gives that rate. This is precisely what we ask the promoters to publish.

(5) The costs per kilometre are calculations, obtained by dividing the announced cost ranges by the announced lengths. They are not quotes.

(6) Transit royalties are not quantified for NIGAL or the AAGP. The only documented figure is the TransMed/Tunisia comparison ($50 M/month for 20 Gm³/year, one transit country), which we cite as a comparison, not as a tariff.

(7) No document establishes a state action intended to prevent NIGAL. The documented difficulties are security and financial. Political causes belong to analysis and are presented as such.

(8) The exact route of the Atlantic project in Western Sahara varies from map to map. The ONHYM map has it arriving at Dakhla; the official length (6,800 to 6,900 km) does not exactly match the ~7,000 km of WSRW's description. We give both.

(9) The reference to resolution 1803 (XVII) is cited by its official number, as reproduced by the legal source cited. The full text of the resolution was not opened directly. We declare it.

(10) Neither NIGAL nor the Atlantic project has delivered a single cubic metre of gas to Europe to date.

(11) The 5% rate is a reported presidential statement, not a signed clause. President A. Tebboune's remarks are reported by the Attaqa platform (4 October 2026); we do not have the palace's official verbatim. The same source corrects the number of countries: 13, not 14.

(12) The two readings of the “15 Gm³” are not settled. That of the editor-in-chief (15 = 50% of capacity, Moroccan share) and that of the texts (“15 for Morocco AND Europe”) do not overlap; the public sources do not allow arbitration. Both are published.

(13) The margin rests on three named assumptions: purchase price $2.18/MMBtu — this is the Nigerian domestic price, used as a proxy because the AAGP gas export price is not published (not established); transit $9 to $11.9/MMBtu (orders of magnitude, not a tariff); exchange rate €1 = $1.17 (assumption). The margin varies from simple to nil depending on the TTF price retained: this is stated in the article. The technical chain, for those who verify: 4.32 Gm³ × 35.3 M MMBtu/Gm³ = 152.5 M MMBtu; × ($28.1 − 2.18 − 9 to 11.9) $/MMBtu = 2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars a year. (Cascade: 6.77 Gm³ → 239 M MMBtu → 3.4 to 4.1 billion.)

(14) The “rebranding” mechanism is not documented. The structure allows the unconsumed volume to be sold via the GME towards Spain; no public contract describes it. We say what the structure allows, and we say “undocumented”.

(15) No revenue-sharing mechanism has been found in the public documents of the Atlantic project. If one exists, it is not public. (And what contradicts the thesis is published: the West African electrification component is real.)

(16) The two calculation bases for the levy in kind are settled by no public source. Fixed basis (13 × 5% of capacity, i.e. 65% of the volume) and cascade basis (49%) (5% of the volume remaining at each border) are both published, with their two results: 4.32 Gm³ resold (fixed) and 6.77 Gm³ (cascade). The cascade calculation (30 × 0.95¹³ ≈ 14.6 Gm³) is an operation, not data.

(17) The combination “transit levy + sharing share” that creates the rent is arithmetic, not documentary. No public clause organises it; it results from two assumptions put end to end, and the article says so.

(18) The piracy ranking has been corrected. The Gulf of Guinea is a documented piracy zone — 21 incidents in 2025 — but it is not the world's leading hotspot: the Singapore Strait is (80 incidents, 58% of the total). We have not retained the superlative. (Source: IMB annual report 2025, published 15 January 2026.)

(19) The robustness of subsea pipelines is not an opinion. We do not write that they are easy to sabotage: the RAND analysis (July 2025) and the Nord Stream attack (September 2022) show that hitting them requires skills and specialised, even state-level, means. What is exposed is the coastal facilities and the riparian states — not the pipe.