The gas is not flowing yet. But the billions, Morocco has already counted them.
Y. Bensalem — Alger, Algérie & J. Hartley — Londres, Royaume-Uni — 2026-10-18
[[IMAGE:tsgp-vs-aagp|The two routes: NIGAL (three countries) and the Atlantic project (thirteen states, plus Western Sahara, which it crosses before entering Morocco).]]
The benefits of gas: a single country collects them. Morocco.
Morocco announces thirteen countries. No, no: not thirteen entities, but fourteen — Western Sahara is a territory, illegally occupied by Morocco.
The UN documents, verifiable: advisory opinion of the ICJ of 16 October 1975 — https://www.icj-cij.org/case/61 · resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly (independence of colonial peoples) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1514(XV) · resolution 1803 (XVII) (permanent sovereignty over natural resources) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1803(XVII) · the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories — https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt · resolution 1541 (XV) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/1541(XV) · Chapter XI of the UN Charter — https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-11 · resolution 34/37 (1979) (inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination) — https://undocs.org/A/RES/34/37 · MINURSO (the Polisario Front is a party to the UN process) — https://minurso.unmissions.org/.
The Atlantic gas project is presented as pan-African. Its benefits are not. Nigeria produces, thirteen states let it through, Europe pays — and Morocco collects. This is not an opinion: it is a chain of calculation.
(See [the full dossier](/en/article/le-maroc-ne-consomme-pas-le-gaz-il-le-revend))
1. Who brings what, who receives what
| Actor | What it brings | What it receives |
|---|---|---|
| Nigeria (producer) | the gas | the selling price, minus the tolls |
| The 12 transit states | the passage | 5% of the gas in kind + royalties |
| Europe | the high price | 5.25 to 7.7 Gm³ — never the “up to 15” promised |
| ⭐ Morocco | nothing (it does not produce the gas, it consumes only 0.93 Gm³ of it) | 2.2 to 4.1 bn $/year of resale margin — in Morocco's coffers alone |
This table is the thesis. It fits in one line: the one who brings the least is the one who gains the most.
2. The volume chain
The announced capacity is 30 Gm³/year. The Algerian president stated the levy rate publicly: “each country has the right to obtain 5% of the gas in return for the right of transit” (remarks reported by the Attaqa platform, 4 October 2026; the same source corrects the number of states to 13, not 14).
The count, without confusion: the 13 states crossed, plus Western Sahara — a total of 14 entities — and not 13 as Morocco announces. Of these entities, thirteen levy: the twelve transit states — from Benin to Morocco, Morocco receives but stores and re-expedites, so it transits too — and Western Sahara. Nigeria, which produces, does not levy. That is thirteen levies out of fourteen entities crossed — 65% of the gas on a fixed basis.
This levy can be calculated in two ways — and no public source settles it:
| Fixed basis (5% of capacity per entity) | Cascade basis (5% of what arrives at each border) | |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity | 30 Gm³ | 30 Gm³ |
| Levy by the 13 entities (12 transit states + Western Sahara) | −19.5 Gm³ | ≈ −15.4 Gm³ |
| = remainder | 10.5 Gm³ | ≈ 15.4 Gm³ |
| − Morocco's share (50%) | 5.25 Gm³ | 7.7 Gm³ |
| = to Europe | 5.25 Gm³ | 7.7 Gm³ |
| − Moroccan consumption | 0.93 Gm³ | 0.93 Gm³ |
| ### = what Morocco resells | ### 4.32 Gm³ | ### 6.77 Gm³ |
Source for Moroccan consumption: EIA — Energy Information Administration (the US energy statistics agency), 2024 data — https://www.worldometers.info/gas/morocco-natural-gas/ (an aggregator reproducing EIA statistics; the EIA's primary page does not expose its values as text).
⭐ And the invariant, which is the note's strength: whatever the calculation basis, Europe receives 5.25 or 7.7 Gm³ — never the “up to 15” officially promised. The contradiction therefore does not depend on the most fragile assumption.
3. The margin — 2.2 to 4.1 billion a year
The assumptions, named — in plain language. A cubic metre of gas is like a litre of petrol: it is paid per unit. Nigerian gas: 8 cents ($0.08) per m³ (NMDPRA domestic base price, 1 April 2026, used as a proxy: the actual export price is not published). Transport and tolls: 32 to 42 cents ($0.32 to $0.42). So, delivered to Morocco: 40 to 50 cents ($0.40 to $0.50) per m³. It resells in Europe: 99 cents ($0.99) per m³ — the September 2026 price. Its margin: $0.50 to $0.60 (50 to 60 cents) per cubic metre. On 4.32 billion m³: 2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars. (On a cascade basis: 6.77 billion m³, i.e. 3.4 to 4.1 billion dollars.)
| Reading (technical table, for verifiers) | Volume resold | MMBtu | Margin at $28.1/MMBtu | Margin at $12.4/MMBtu |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fixed basis | 4.32 Gm³ | 126 M | 2.2 to 2.6 bn $/year | $0.2 bn to a loss |
| Cascade | 6.77 Gm³ | 225.6 M | 3.4 to 4.1 bn $/year | $0.3 bn to a loss |
The figure to remember: 2.2 to 4.1 billion dollars a year — for an actor that does not produce the molecule and consumes almost none of it.
2.2 to 2.6 billion dollars a year — in Morocco's coffers alone. And let no one talk to us about African integration, because here the benefits, Morocco alone pockets them.
⚠️ And the nuance that protects the note: this margin exists only at crisis prices. At 2024-2025 prices, the tolls absorb everything: the margin falls to zero or to a loss. The rentier is not rich at all times: he is rich when Europe is afraid.
4. What Morocco gives back: nothing documented
This is where the editor-in-chief's question finds its answer — without a single adjective.
- The 12 transit states receive something documented: 5% of the gas in kind and, per industry practice, transit royalties. They are not the losers of the arrangement.
- Nigeria receives the price of its molecule, minus the tolls and levies: it sells, and it collects.
- Europe pays the high price: it buys at the market price.
- Morocco, for its part, does not produce, does not consume what it receives, and resells the rest. What it gives back to the other parties: no benefit-sharing mechanism appears in the public documents — neither in the NNPC press release, nor in the official Moroccan statement, nor in ONHYM's remarks. These texts describe a project company in Casablanca, a regulatory authority in Abuja, a final investment decision to be prepared, and a share of volume. Not a formula for sharing the margins.
If such a mechanism exists, it is not public — and we write it. It is not “Morocco does not pay”: it is “no public document says what it gives back”. The difference is that between denunciation and demonstration.
⚠️ And what contradicts the thesis, also published: the project includes a real West African electrification component, which brings something to the states crossed — it is a real contribution, and it is mentioned here. The criticism concerns the sharing of the margin, not the existence of the project.
5. Pan-African in words. Moroccan in arithmetic.
The narrative, quoted
The project's official vocabulary is that of integration (quotations translated from the English). The promoters write that the pipeline “aims to establish an integrated regional natural gas market across West Africa”, that it must “support power generation, industrialisation and the development of the continent's natural resources”, and that it is “a true development corridor linking African economies” (Morocco.ma, 19 July 2026). NNPC and ONHYM present it as “a transformative regional project intended to unlock the vast gas resources of West Africa” and to “integrate African energy markets” (NNPC press release, July 2026). ONHYM's director speaks of “a continental project of development and economic integration” (Hespress, July 2026).
The silence, demonstrated
Nowhere, in this official communication, does Moroccan consumption appear alongside the announced volumes. Yet it is of the order of 1 billion cubic metres a year — 0.93 Gm³ in 2024. And the calculation is simple: 5.25 Gm³ received − 0.93 consumed = 4.32 Gm³ resold.
The question, asked without an adjective: a country that consumes 1 billion m³ and to which 15 are promised does not need gas. It needs a crossing point.
The beneficiaries — and the excluded
What the states crossed receive: 5% of the gas in kind and royalties (documented). What Morocco receives: the resale margin, 2.2 to 4.1 billion dollars a year (calculation above). And what does not exist: no benefit-sharing mechanism in the public texts (established in chapter 4).
“A project that talks of Africa and whose benefits go to the coffers of the Moroccan state: that is a narrative. Not an integration.”
On the state of the texts: the benefits go to Morocco alone.
6. Conclusion
Nigeria produces. Thirteen states let it through. Europe pays. Morocco collects — without producing, without consuming, and without giving back.
What the note demonstrates is not an intention: it is a table. 5.25 or 7.7 Gm³ for Europe, 2.2 to 4.1 billion a year for a country whose consumption is 0.93. The calculation does not ask who is right: it asks where the money goes.
Y. Bensalem — Algiers, Algeria · independent consultant in energy and hydrocarbons
J. Hartley — London, United Kingdom · independent analyst in infrastructure financing
📚 FULL BIBLIOGRAPHY (rule 19)
1. NNPC Limited (official press release), “Major Boost for African Atlantic Gas Pipeline as ECOWAS Member States Sign Historic Intergovernmental Agreement”, July 2026 — 30 Gm³/year “of which up to 15 Gm³ for the supply of Morocco and European markets”; 13 countries; FEED completed; project company in Casablanca, authority in Abuja — https://nnpcgroup.com/insights/press-release-major-boost-for-african-atlantic-gas-pipeline-as-ecowas-member-states-sign-historic-intergovernmental-agreement
2. Maroc.ma (official portal of the Moroccan government), “Freetown: ECOWAS Member States Endorse Nigeria-Morocco African Atlantic Gas Pipeline Initiative”, 19 July 2026 — 30 Gm³/year of which up to 15 Gm³ “exported to Morocco and Europe”, the rest for regional markets; first sections “at the start of the next decade” — https://maroc.ma/en/news/freetown-ecowas-member-states-endorse-nigeria-morocco-african-atlantic-gas-pipeline-initiative
3. Attaqa (ar), specialised energy platform, « لأول مرة.. الرئيس الجزائري يعلق على مشروع المغرب لتصدير الغاز النيجيري », 4 October 2026 — statement by President A. Tebboune: the alternative project “passes through 14 countries, and each country has the right to obtain 5% of the gas in return for the right of transit”; Attaqa corrects: 13 countries — https://attaqa.net/2026/10/04/%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%88%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%82-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%85%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%88/
4. DZWatch, “American Expert Validates Tebboune's Morocco Pipeline Assessment”, 2026 — Geoff D. Porter: 11 transit countries, 5% in kind, TransMed / Tunisia: $50 M/month for 20 Gm³/year, extrapolation $9.9 bn/year for 11 countries — https://dzwatch.dz/american-expert-validates-tebbounes-morocco-pipeline-assessment/
5. Le Quotidien d'Oran, « Un expert américain enterre le projet marocain », 2026 — Porter: 11 countries, 5% of gas in kind, TransMed comparison — https://lequotidien-oran.dz/evenement/un-expert-americain-enterre-le-projet-marocain
6. Hespress (en), “Morocco's gas imports rose by 6.9% in 2025”, 9 February 2026 — imports 10.375 TWh in 2025 versus 9.703 TWh in 2024; 24.9% of Spanish gas exports to Morocco (source CORES); Russian and American LNG; Shell contract of 500 million m³/year (July 2023) — https://en.hespress.com/131490-moroccos-gas-imports-rise-6-9-in-2025.html
7. Worldometer (aggregator, after EIA international statistics), Morocco Natural Gas — 2024 consumption: 933,968,773 m³ (≈ 0.93 Gm³), of which 95.4% imported; production 43 M m³ — https://www.worldometers.info/gas/morocco-natural-gas/
8. Nairametrics, “NMDPRA raises gas price to $2.18/MMBTU, effective April 2026”, 1 April 2026 — Nigerian domestic base gas price: $2.18/MMBtu; $2.68/MMBtu for commercial users — https://nairametrics.com/2026/04/01/nmdpra-raises-gas-price-to-2-18-mmbtu-effective-april-2026/
9. GME (Gestore dei Mercati Energetici, Italy), 2025 report — TTF 2025: €36.2/MWh (+5.5%) — https://gme.mercatoelettrico.org/Portals/0/Documents/en-US/20260511BilancioGME2025.pdf
10. GMK Center, “European gas prices exceeded €80/MWh in September”, 2026 — TTF: €82/MWh on 10 September 2026; June 2026 average: €44.94/MWh — https://gmk.center/en/news/european-gas-prices-exceeded-e80-mwh-in-september/
11. Hespress (en), “Benkhadra: Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline enters new phase after ECOWAS summit”, July 2026 — memorandum of 15 September 2022; project company in Casablanca, authority in Abuja, then investors and final investment decision — https://en.hespress.com/142301-benkhadra-morocco-nigeria-gas-pipeline-enters-new-phase-after-ecowas-summit.html
12. Pipeline & Gas Journal / Reuters, “30-Bcm Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline Wins ECOWAS Backing”, July 2026 — 6,900 km; ~$25 bn; feasibility and FEED completed — https://www.pgjonline.com/news/2026/july/30-bcm-nigeria-morocco-gas-pipeline-wins-ecowas-backing
⚠️ Published reservations.
(1) The 5% rate is a reported presidential statement, not a signed clause — remarks quoted by Attaqa on 4 October 2026; the palace's official verbatim is not available. The same source corrects the number of countries (13, not 14).
(2) The two calculation bases for the levy are settled by no public source: fixed basis (4.32 Gm³ resold) and cascade (6.77 Gm³) are both published. The cascade calculation (30 × 0.95¹³ ≈ 15.4 Gm³) is an operation, not data.
(3) Morocco's 50% share is a reading, not an official clause. The texts say “up to 15 Gm³ for Morocco AND Europe”; both readings are published, with no possible arbitration on the sources.
(4) The margin rests on named assumptions: $2.18/MMBtu is a Nigerian domestic price used as a proxy (the export price is not published — not established); transit $9 to $11/MMBtu (orders of magnitude); exchange rate €1 = $1.17 (assumption); variable TTF.
(5) The margin disappears at 2024-2025 prices — this is stated in the article.
(6) No benefit-sharing mechanism was found in the public documents. If one exists, it is not public. We do not write that Morocco refuses to give back: we write that no document says what it gives back.
(7) The West African electrification component is real and published — it brings something to the countries crossed, and it is mentioned in the article.
(8) No insult, no judgment on a people or a nation. No accusation against a state without a document.