The “1975 software” is incompatible with reality: Hespress writes it — and the resolution it cites contains the word “referendum”
Róisín Gallagher — Liverpool, Royaume-Uni — 2026-10-07
Method note. The op-ed we answer here insults no one, and it is well written. We will therefore reproach it neither for its tone nor for its intentions: we will take it seriously, and we will set against it the texts it invokes itself.
On 6 October 2026 at 20h49, Hespress published an op-ed signed by Dr Said Laqabi, of Cadi Ayyad University in Safi. It is called “Algeria and the Boomerang Effect”.
The device is skilful, and it must be acknowledged: instead of accusing, the op-ed compares. The Security Council becomes a “diplomatic Minitel” — 36 15 SAHARA. Algerian diplomacy becomes obsolete software: “Error 404: software 404 incompatible with reality.” And history turns into a tale: Algeria slipped a pebble into the Moroccan shoe, and Tom Thumb turned it into a road.
It is funny. It is literary. And it is refutable — by the text the op-ed cites.
First: the word it uses, and the word the text employs
The op-ed relies on resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025. It describes it as follows: the text “reaffirms the search for a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise and compatible with the principle of self-determination”.
Up to that point, it is accurate. We confirm it.
But then a simple question arises, and the op-ed never asks it: if the 1975 software were incompatible with reality, why did the Security Council keep the word “referendum” in the name of the mission it extends?
For resolution 2797 extends MINURSO. And MINURSO stands for: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
That is not an archival detail: it is the name of the mission created by resolution 690 of 29 April 1991, and which the text of 31 October 2025 extends until 31 October 2026.
Obsolete software is uninstalled. The UN renewed it — word for word, name for name.
Second: the op-ed says “self-determination” — and it is written in the decision paragraph
The op-ed acknowledges that the word self-determination appears in the resolution. We go further: it is not only in the preamble, where words commit no one. It is in DECISION PARAGRAPH No. 3, the one that orders.
Here is what the Council requests, word for word:
“Requests the parties to participate in the discussions without preconditions and on the basis of the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco in order to reach a definitive and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, considers that a genuine autonomy could represent one of the most feasible solutions […]”
There are two things in that sentence, and the op-ed keeps only one:
1. Self-determination, yes — but as the goal to be reached.
2. The autonomy plan, yes — but in the CONDITIONAL: “could represent”.
And paragraph 2 of the same text adds this, which the op-ed conceals:
“[…] and would welcome any constructive suggestion the parties might make in response to the autonomy plan.”
Obsolete software is replaced. A text that opens the door to “any constructive suggestion” and writes “could” twice is called an open text.
The op-ed reproaches us for living in 1975. It cites a text from 2025 which did not close the door of 1975.
Third: the story the op-ed tells — and the episode it avoids
**The op-ed devotes several paragraphs to a psychological thesis: a political system that “depends durably on the existence of an enemy”. It then asks the real question: *“what is to be done when reality refuses to follow the script?”***
That is the right question. So let us answer it — with dates, not with intentions.
- 24 May 1991: the Secretary-General proposes a ceasefire from 6 September 1991. Both parties accept it — Morocco as well as the Polisario Front.
- 1990-1992: the Settlement Plan sets a referendum for January 1992, by which “the Sahrawi people would choose between independence and integration with Morocco”. The timetable was not respected. The principle itself was never cancelled.
- 12 August 2025: John Bolton, former United States national security adviser and former ambassador to the UN, states: “We have been working to organise that referendum since 1991”, the Council's resolutions were “clear and transparent”, and “what Morocco refused”.
We attribute that quotation to the person who made it, in which outlet and on what date — Bolton was speaking in an interview with a Sahrawi outlet, and he does not bind the United States. But it is an American Republican, a former ambassador to the UN, who says it.
So “reality” did not refuse the script. It is one party that withdrew from the script. That is not the same thing, and it is the whole difference between obsolete software and an unkept commitment.
Fourth: the figure — we verified it. The op-ed is right, and it changes nothing.
The op-ed writes that resolution 2797 was adopted “by 11 votes in favour, none against and 3 abstentions”, and that “Algeria did not take part in the vote”.
We opened the official record of the meeting. The op-ed is right on every count: eleven votes in favour, none against, three abstentions — and Algeria does not take part in the vote.
We write it all the more willingly because it is our rule: a figure is verified, and when it is exact, it is stated.
And here is what the same record adds — what the op-ed omits:
1. The three abstentions are China, Pakistan and Russia. They are not supporters of Algiers: it is the text itself that was judged unbalanced. Russia, which chaired the Council in October 2025, says it was “surprised by the approach adopted”. Three members out of fifteen refused to vote for a text that is presented today as a consensus.
2. And Algeria gave its reason, publicly, before the Council. Its representative, Mr Bendjama, put it in these terms:
“My country did not participate in the vote on the resolution […] Through this absence, and acting with the greatest responsibility, Algeria wished to show that it distances itself from a text that does not faithfully or sufficiently reflect the doctrine of the United Nations.”
The op-ed prefers to see in it a “diplomatic theatre” and a “presence by absence”. That is an interpretation. The Council, for its part, recorded an explanation of vote — and it is public.
3. And here is the decisive point: in the record of that meeting, ALL the delegations call the mission by its official name — United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Korea, Denmark, Guyana, Panama, Greece, Somalia, Pakistan: all of them, without exception.
And the United Kingdom, a permanent member that voted IN FAVOUR, adds this before the Council:
“[This text] represents a step towards a just and lasting political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. It is the beginning of the process of finding a mutually acceptable solution — not the end.”
“Not the end.” Including for a permanent member that voted in favour.
So the op-ed's figure is exact. It does not say what the op-ed wants it to say.
What we concede — because it is the rule
A dossier that concedes nothing is worth nothing. So here is what the op-ed gets right:
- Algeria is indeed named in the preamble of resolution 2797. Alongside Morocco, the Polisario Front and Mauritania. We write it, because it is written.
- Algerian diplomacy long recited the same formula, and that could give the impression of a scratched record. That is a legitimate criticism, and we do not reject it on principle.
- The Moroccan autonomy plan is cited as the basis of the discussions in the two relevant paragraphs of the text. We do not deny it.
- On memory and on the way States narrate their own history, the op-ed asks a question that is not foolish. It holds for every capital, including the one that publishes it.
And the conclusion, which we leave to the reader
Hespress asserts that the 1975 software is incompatible with reality.
The text it cites was adopted on 31 October 2025. It extends, until 31 October 2026, a mission called the “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara”. It uses the conditional twice on autonomy. It reaffirms self-determination in its decision paragraph. It opens the door to “any constructive suggestion”.
It is not we who say so. It is the text. And the text is online.
The reader who opens it will judge. That is all we ask.
Sources: United Nations Security Council, resolution 2797 (2025), 31 October 2025, symbol S/RES/2797 (2025) — full public text: https://docs.un.org/fr/S/RES/2797(2025). — Security Council, resolution 690 of 29 April 1991 (creation of MINURSO). — Report of the Secretary-General of 18 June 1990 (Settlement Plan; referendum scheduled for January 1992; choice between independence and integration with Morocco); 24 May 1991 (ceasefire accepted by both parties). — John Bolton, former United States national security adviser and former ambassador to the UN, interview of 12 August 2025 (cited as such, he does not bind the United States). — Hespress, “Algeria and the Boomerang Effect”, Dr Said Laqabi, Cadi Ayyad University – Safi, 6 October 2026, 20h49. — La Nouvelle Tribune, “The Security Council opens its sequence on the Sahara”, 7 October 2026 (meetings of 7 and 8 October, mandate expiring on 31 October, United States as penholder). — United Nations Security Council, official record of the 10030th meeting (S/PV.10030), 31 October 2025: 11 votes in favour, 0 against, 3 abstentions (China, Pakistan, Russian Federation); Algeria's non-participation and Mr Bendjama's explanation of vote; quotations from the delegations, including that of the United Kingdom (“not the end”), in the English version of the record. — UN Project (Security Council voting database), record for resolution 2797 (2025).