Western Sahara: The International Court of Justice Said "No Sovereignty." So Go Ahead. Hold the Vote.
Nathalie Rochat — Genève, Suisse — 2026-09-11
There is one thing you can grant to those who dispute the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination: they are consistent. Their thesis is simple, repeated everywhere, hammered home in the media and in international forums. And for half a century, it has run into an obstacle no press release will make disappear: the texts.
So let us do what nobody does. Let us go back to the texts. One by one. And at the end, let us ask a single question — the one nobody ever dares to ask out loud.
First text: the International Court of Justice, October 16, 1975
Let us start with the document that is always misquoted. On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on Western Sahara.
Official source: https://www.icj-cij.org/case/61
The Court had been asked by the UN General Assembly, through resolution 3292 (XXIX) of December 13, 1974 (A/RES/3292 (XXIX)), to answer two precise questions:
"I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? "
Here now is paragraph 162 of the opinion, quoted word for word — the French text being the authoritative one:
"The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. […] On the other hand, the Court concludes that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara on the one hand and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity on the other. "
And the consequence, in the same sentence:
"The Court has thus not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and authentic expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory. "
Let us read that slowly, because everything is there.
The Court did recognize ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some tribes — the word is "some," and it counts. But it concluded, by fourteen votes to two, that those ties constituted no tie of territorial sovereignty. And it added that the principle of self-determination remained fully applicable.
At paragraph 158 of the same opinion, the Court states of its own motion that those ties "did not imply territorial sovereignty, nor co-sovereignty, nor territorial inclusion in a legal entity."
Let us translate without hedging: in international law, Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara has never been established. Never. By anyone.
Second text: UN resolution 3162, December 14, 1973
A year before referring the matter to the Court, the General Assembly had already settled the principle. Resolution 3162 (XXVIII) of December 14, 1973 (A/RES/3162 (XXVIII)), adopted at the 2202nd plenary meeting, reaffirms:
"Reaffirms its attachment to the principle of self-determination and its desire that this principle be applied in a framework guaranteeing to the inhabitants of the Sahara under Spanish domination the free and authentic expression of their wishes. "
And it invites the administering Power to determine, together with Morocco and Mauritania, "and any other interested party," "the modalities for the organization of a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations allowing the indigenous population of the Sahara to freely exercise its right to self-determination and independence."
Mark the date. 1973. It is the one people often remember — and it is the right one: the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination and to independence has been written into a resolution of the UN General Assembly for more than fifty years.
Third text: the commitment of Hassan II, Nairobi, June 25, 1981
And now, the episode the defenders of the status quo would rather we forget.
In June 1981, the 18th ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity was held in Nairobi. On June 25, 1981, King Hassan II took the floor and accepted the holding of a referendum in Western Sahara.
This is not an interpretation, it is an official OAU text. Resolution AHG/Res.103 (XVIII) of June 27, 1981:
"Noting with satisfaction the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II to accept the holding of a referendum in Western Sahara "
"WELCOMES the solemn commitment made by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco to accept the organization of a referendum in the territory of Western Sahara. "
Two clarifications for the sake of honesty, because we do not cheat:
First, this was a "controlled referendum," which Hassan II himself called "confirmatory." So it was not meant to be a free choice, but a confirmation. We take note of it — and we come back to it at the end.
Second, no date was set in 1981. The only date ever written down came two years later: resolution AHG/Res.104 (XIX) of June 1983 set the referendum for December 1983. December 1983 came and went. No vote has been held.
Fourth text: the settlement plan, 1991 — and what it provided for exactly
Ten years later, the UN took up the file again. The chain is long, but it is public: resolution 621 (1988), proposals accepted in principle by both parties on August 30, 1988, report S/21360 of June 18, 1990, resolution 658 (1990), then report S/22464 of April 19, 1991, and finally resolution 690 of April 29, 1991 (S/RES/690), which created MINURSO — the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
What did that plan provide for? Three things, and they are decisive.
One — the vote was to offer a choice between "integration with Morocco and independence," by simple majority, by secret ballot (S/22464, §37).
Two — the electoral body was defined: "all Sahrawis listed in the 1974 census carried out by the Spanish authorities and aged 18 or older" (S/21360, §24).
Three — the organization and conduct of the vote fell under the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations (S/22464, §9).
The ceasefire entered into force on September 6, 1991, at 00:00 GMT. The referendum itself was scheduled for January 1992.
And here is what the UN writes itself
We do not need to comment. MINURSO's official website says it all:
> "The referendum in Western Sahara was to take place in January 1992. […] the referendum has never been held. "
Source: https://minurso.unmissions.org/en
Forty-five years after the Nairobi commitment. Thirty-four years after the settlement plan. The vote has never been held.
Why? Again, it is not us saying it. It is the UN Secretary-General, in his report S/2000/131, paragraph 33:
"The two parties seem to share the conviction that the composition of the electoral body will predetermine the outcome of the referendum. At different times, therefore, one or the other party refused to cooperate with MINURSO's identification procedures. "
The UN documents the numbers: 198,469 applicants interviewed between 1994 and 1999, 86,386 deemed eligible, 131,038 appeals filed — 61.1% of them in Morocco.
So yes, there were blockages on both sides: the Polisario in 1995-1997, Morocco from 2000 onward. And the UN says so. But there is one fact these numbers establish that nobody can deny: the broader the electoral body was to be, the more Morocco refused to move forward. On June 28, 2000, in London, Morocco warned that it "would not participate in a referendum in which Sahrawis who might be entitled to vote were not allowed to do so" (S/2000/683, §5). In other words: a referendum with too many Sahrawis, no. A referendum with too few, the Polisario would not accept. And the vote has never been held.
What the law says today
Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory. It has been on the United Nations list since 1963 — established by the legal opinion of the UN Legal Counsel, S/2002/161 of January 29, 2002, which spells out three decisive points:
"The Madrid Agreement did not transfer sovereignty over the Territory […] The transfer of administrative authority did not affect the international status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. "
and, at paragraph 7:
"Morocco, on the other hand, is not listed as an administering Power […] and has therefore not transmitted information on the Territory in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter."
The most recent confirmation: the Secretary-General's report A/80/290 of July 31, 2025 indicates that the Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee treat Western Sahara as "a Non-Self-Governing Territory and a decolonization issue."
And there is something else, which the partisans of the fait accompli like to ignore. The UN General Assembly has used the word "occupation." Resolution 34/37 of November 21, 1979 (A/RES/34/37):
"Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco "
and, at paragraph 6:
"Calls upon Morocco to join the peace process and to put an end to the occupation of the Territory. "
We will be precise, out of honesty: no UN body today formally applies that label, and the Security Council never picks the term up. What is established is more sober and more solid: Western Sahara is a Non-Self-Governing Territory, whose sovereignty does not belong to Morocco, and of which Morocco is not the administering Power.
The Court of Justice of the European Union: four rulings, one same logic
European law has been seized of the matter several times. The decisions are public, and they all point the same way.
December 21, 2016 — case C-104/16 P: "The Association and Liberalisation Agreements concluded between the EU and Morocco are not applicable to Western Sahara," on the basis of the "separate and distinct status guaranteed to the territory of Western Sahara under the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of self-determination of peoples."
February 27, 2018 — case C-266/16: the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement is valid "in so far as it is not applicable to Western Sahara and the waters adjacent thereto."
October 4, 2024 — joined cases C-778/21 P, C-798/21 P, C-779/21 P, C-799/21 P: the 2019 EU-Morocco trade agreements on fisheries and agricultural products, "to which the people of Western Sahara did not consent, were concluded in disregard of the principles of self-determination and of the relative effect of treaties." The Court adds that the consent of the Sahrawi people is "a condition for the validity" of the decisions of the Council of the EU.
October 4, 2024, as well — case C-399/22: "The labeling of melons and tomatoes harvested in Western Sahara must indicate that territory, and not Morocco, as the country of origin. "
Let us hold on to that last point: its reach is considerable. In Europe, on a melon label, you cannot write "Morocco." European law treats Western Sahara as a distinct territory, whose people are a third party whose consent is required.
The setback of 2025 — and what must not be allowed to pass
We will not say that everything is heading in the right direction. That would be false, and we do not lie.
Security Council resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025 (S/RES/2797) marks a turning point. Adopted by 11 votes in favor, 0 against, 3 abstentions (China, Pakistan, Russia) — with Algeria absent — it extends MINURSO until October 31, 2026 and retains the Moroccan autonomy plan as a "basis" for negotiations.
Two shifts are documented there by comparing the texts, and they are serious:
1. The phrase "breakdown of the ceasefire" — present in resolutions 2602 (2021), 2654 (2022), 2703 (2023) and 2756 (2024) — disappears entirely from resolution 2797. It is replaced by a neutral formula on "the importance of respecting the ceasefire."
2. Any reference to human rights likewise disappears. Whereas the previous resolutions, from 2018 to 2024, called for cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, resolution 2797 no longer contains the phrase "human rights."
And one fact I found nowhere else, and that deserves to be read twice. In the verbatim record of the October 31, 2025 meeting — the official document S/PV.10030, which records the adoption of the resolution — the phrase "human rights" appears zero times. Not one of the fifteen members of the Security Council said a single word about human rights monitoring in Western Sahara at the moment of renewing MINURSO's mandate. Not one. The word is absent in English and in French alike. Source: https://undocs.org/S/PV.10030
And one clarification that matters: the resolution says the Moroccan plan is "a basis" — a basis —, never "the only basis" — the only basis. Morocco reads it as a consecration. The Front Polisario, in an official memorandum of November 24, 2025 (S/2025/764), notes: "Resolution 2797 (2025) does not establish the Moroccan "proposal" as the only basis for negotiations. It is designated as "a basis" — not the basis. "
Where the war stands today
The ceasefire of September 6, 1991 was broken on November 13, 2020, at Guerguerat. A point of honesty, and it matters: no United Nations instance has attributed that breakdown to either of the two parties. The Secretary-General merely records the "resumption of hostilities" — and he notes firing on both sides that day. He also records that a decree by Brahim Ghali declared, on November 14, 2020, the end of the Front Polisario's commitment to the ceasefire.
And the UN documents what follows, without taking sides. Its report S/2025/612 of September 30, 2025 counts 142 shooting incidents reported by the Royal Army between September 1, 2024 and August 31, 2025, about half of them in the Mahbas area. It mentions 18 alleged airstrikes — the UN writes "unmanned aircraft," never "drones" — of which only 9 could be investigated, the Polisario having refused to cooperate on the other nine. It notes that MINURSO patrols are limited to 20 kilometers from the sites east of the berm, and that no helicopter flight has been authorized since November 2020. It finds that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has had no access to the territory since 2015. And it writes: "Nearly five years have elapsed since the resumption of hostilities. "
We will give no casualty toll, because the UN itself provides none and could not directly confirm the majority of the reported incidents. We refuse to put forward a figure we cannot prove. But we say what the UN says: they are shooting at each other, every day, for five years now, and nobody is counting the dead.
And Europe, for its part, has moved
One fact went almost unnoticed, and it is considerable.
On Thursday, September 10, 2026, the Spanish Congress approved a legislative proposal on granting Spanish nationality to Sahrawis born under Spanish administration: 168 votes in favor, 31 against, 145 abstentions. The text provides for nationality by letter of naturalization for Sahrawis born in Western Sahara before September 29, 1977, even without legal residence in Spain.
Among the proofs accepted by the text: the UN-authenticated receipt of registration in the referendum census.
Measure what that means. Spain, a former administering Power, recognizes through the voice of its Parliament that these people fall under a particular status — and accepts as an identity document a piece of paper issued by the United Nations for a referendum that has never been held.
So now: I dare you
Let us gather it all. And ask the question.
1973 — the UN General Assembly reaffirms the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination and to independence, and calls for the organization of a referendum under UN auspices.
1975 — the International Court of Justice concludes, by fourteen votes to two, that there is no tie of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco.
1981 — King Hassan II solemnly accepts, before the OAU summit in Nairobi, the holding of a referendum. A referendum he himself calls "confirmatory."
1983 — the OAU sets the date: December 1983. Nothing.
1991 — the settlement plan provides for a choice between independence and integration, on the basis of the 1974 Spanish census. Ceasefire on September 6. Referendum scheduled for January 1992.
2026 — the UN writes, on its own mission's website: "the referendum has never been held."
Fifty-three years after the 1973 resolution. Forty-five years after the Nairobi commitment. Thirty-five years after the settlement plan.
So here is our proposal, and we make it to the whole world.
Since Morocco itself accepted a referendum — in 1981, solemnly, before a gathered Africa — let it hold one.
Since Hassan II called it "confirmatory" — let it confirm.
Since the International Court of Justice said there has never been Moroccan sovereignty — let the Sahrawis be asked.
Since the UN has a plan, an electoral body, and a mission on the ground since 1991 — let it be applied.
I dare you. The vote on independence. You accepted it. You have never organized it. Organize it.
Because a country that holds a territory without recognized sovereignty, against the opinion of the highest international court, against the right to self-determination written into the Charter, and without ever having dared to ask the inhabitants what they think — that country does not govern. It occupies.
And History has a flaw that walls, settlements and press releases do not correct: it always ends up giving the land back to its people.
The Sahrawi land is waiting. It will not wait indefinitely. And the day it becomes its children's land again, nobody will be able to say they did not know — because since 1973, the texts have said so.