85 votes for, 6 against: the Polisario has been recognised since 1979

Sarah Carter — New York, États-Unis — 2026-10-02

And almost nobody knows what its name means

On Wednesday 30 September 2026, in New York, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Waltz, received a delegation of the Polisario Front.

After the meeting, he posted the photograph of the talks on X, with these words:

“The refugees in the Tindouf camps have waited fifty years. They deserve real choices, not another decade of waiting. The basis for a solution is on the table.”

The Moroccan press immediately spoke of a Polisario “manoeuvre” in Washington.

It has a problem. The Polisario does not need to be received in order to exist. It is recognised — officially, in writing, and for a long time.

First: where does the word “Polisario” come from?

This is the question nobody asks, and yet it is the first thing to understand.

“Polisario” is not a name. It is an acronym.

The movement's full name is Spanish: Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro. In English: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro.

Let us break it down word by word:

SpanishEnglish
Frentethe Front
Popularpopular
de Liberaciónof liberation
Saguía el Hamrathe northern part of the territory
y Río de Oroand the southern part

Take the syllables: PO-LI-SA-RIO. There is the word.

And here is what it means.

Saguia el-Hamra (الساقية الحمراء) means “the red channel” — after the dried-up wadi bed that runs through the region. It is the northern part of the territory, which the Spanish also called Spanish Sahara of the North.

Río de Oro (وادي الذهب) means “the river of gold” — it is the southern part, a former Spanish territory from 1884 to 1976, whose capital was Villa Cisneros, today's Dakhla.

These two regions, taken together, form Western Sahara.

It is not we who say so: it is written in the very name the UN uses. When the General Assembly refers the matter to the International Court of Justice, on 13 December 1974, it does so under “Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra)”. The name of the independence movement is the name of the territory as the UN writes it.

In other words: when you say the word “Polisario”, you are saying the name of the country that movement claims.

Where and when it was created

The Polisario Front was created on 10 May 1973 — two years before Franco's death, and at a time when the Sahara was still a Spanish colony. So it was not created “against Morocco”: it was created against Spain, to win the independence of a colony.

Three men have led it in more than fifty years:

  • El-Ouali Moustapha Sayed, the founder and first secretary-general, who died in 1976;
  • Mohamed Abdelaziz, from 1976 until his death in 2016;
  • Brahim Ghali, since 2016.

On 27 February 1976, the Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. And it then took the official name the UN still uses: Movement for the Liberation of Saguia El-Hamra and Oued Ed-Dahab.

On the exact place of the founding, accounts differ — several sources place the constitutive meeting in Zouérate, in Mauritania. We flag this rather than settle it.

And now, the recognition

Here is what the Moroccan press, and many others, pretend to forget.

On 21 November 1979, the UN General Assembly voted. The result is unambiguous: 85 for, 6 against, 41 abstentions.

Who voted against? Morocco, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala and Saudi Arabia. Six countries.

And here is what the two paragraphs that matter say.

Paragraph 1:

“Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and to independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV), as well as the legitimacy of its struggle for the enjoyment of that right…”

Paragraph 7 — the one nobody ever quotes:

“Recommends in this connection that the Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution…”

Let us read that sentence again.

It is not Algiers that calls the Polisario Front “the representative of the people of Western Sahara”. It is not a campaigning organisation, nor a newspaper, nor an opinion column. It is the United Nations General Assembly, in 1979, in a text adopted by 85 states against 6.

The recognition of the Polisario as representative of the Sahrawi people is therefore not a prospect. It is a fact established for forty-seven years.

And there is more. The same text, paragraph 5:

“Deeply deplores the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;”

And paragraph 6:

“Urges Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the territory of Western Sahara;”

The word is used twice: occupation. By the General Assembly. In the same vote.

What else the UN has written about this territory

Let us begin with the file nobody consults: the list of non-self-governing territories.

Western Sahara has appeared on it since 1963, after Spain transmitted information under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations.

One detail in that list deserves a pause. Every non-self-governing territory there is attached to an administering power — France for Polynesia, the United Kingdom for Pitcairn. For Western Sahara, the box is empty.

[[BAR]]

Where the UN files Western Sahara

Non-self-governing territory | since 1963 | —

!Administering power | box empty | —

Recorded area | 266 000 | km²

Recorded population | 612 000 | inhabitants

[[/BAR]]

In 2026 the General Secretariat still confirms it (document A/81/295 of 31 July 2026): Western Sahara is treated “as a non-self-governing territory and a decolonisation question”.

In its own files, then, the UN does not classify Western Sahara as a region of Morocco.

And the decisions, one by one

16 December 1965 — resolution 2072 (XX). The General Assembly urges Spain, the administering power, “to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination”. Vote: 100 for, 2 against — Spain and Portugal.

20 December 1966 — resolution 2229 (XXI). It “reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Ifni and Spanish Sahara to self-determination” and calls for a referendum under United Nations auspices, specifying that “only the indigenous inhabitants of the territory shall participate in the referendum”.

16 October 1975 — the International Court of Justice. On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly had asked it what legal ties bound Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The Court's answer:

“…the materials and information presented to the Court do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.”

The Court did indeed recognise ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and certain tribes. That has to be said, because it is true — and because it makes what follows more decisive: ties of allegiance between a sovereign and tribes are not sovereignty over a territory. That is exactly the distinction the Court drew, and it is the one the Moroccan thesis does not cross.

29 April 1991 — resolution 690. The Security Council unanimously creates the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. The plan provides for a transition period leading to a referendum in which “the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco”.

It is written in black and white on the mission's official fact sheet, updated on 22 January 2026. Thirty-five years later, the question has never been put.

The Moroccan plan is not “the” plan

On 31 October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2797, at the end of its 10030th meeting. Vote: 11 for, none against, 3 abstentions — China, Pakistan and Russia. One member took no part in the vote: Algeria.

The Moroccan reading of that text is well known: the UN is said to have made Moroccan autonomy the basis of everything. That is false, and it is the Americans who say so.

On 4 November 2025, four days after the vote, Massad Boulos — Donald Trump's adviser for Africa and the Middle East, and one of the architects of the text — set out his position on France 24. He distinguishes two things: the official position of the United States and of Donald Trump, who see autonomy as “the only solution”; and the resolution of 31 October, which itself leaves the door open to other ideas.

According to him, “the problem lies only in the preamble of the resolution and not in the operative provisions. Without that, we could have had a unanimous vote of all 15 members, including Algeria.”

In other words: no exclusivity for the Moroccan proposal.

And on the referendum, he does not close it off: it remains an available option, and it is for the parties to decide during the negotiations. “There can be a form of vote, as in any election.”

He finally states the essential point: the two parties to the conflict are Morocco and the Polisario Front. Not Morocco alone.

One technical detail finishes the job. The sentence about “genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty” appears in the preamble — the considerations, which have no binding force. The operative part, for its part, is content to “take as a basis” the Moroccan proposal in order to engage in discussions, and still requires “a final, mutually acceptable political solution which provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”.

And the United Nations mission keeps its name: Mission for the Referendum.

No UN resolution has ever recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. General Assembly resolution 80/89, adopted on 5 December 2025, again recalls “the responsibility of the United Nations towards the people of Western Sahara”.

Washington now talks to all four

In late January 2026, then on Sunday 8 February 2026, the United States brought together in Madrid, at their ambassador's residence, delegations of four parties: Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and the Polisario Front. Three members per delegation, led by foreign ministers. The meeting was chaired by Massad Boulos, accompanied by Michael Waltz and by Staffan de Mistura, the Secretary-General's personal envoy. A first 48-hour meeting had been held in Washington in January.

The fact, revealed by the Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero in El Confidencial, was confirmed by Middle East Eye on 9 February 2026. The same article reports that Washington asked Morocco to fully revise its autonomy proposal: the document grew from three pages to forty.

On 13 September 2026, Massad Boulos lands in Algiers — for the third time in fourteen months, after 27 July 2025 and 27 January 2026. He is received by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, and meets Prime Minister Sifi Ghrieb and Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf. Publicly, he talks energy with Sonatrach. The Algerian foreign ministry confirms, for its part, that three regional files were discussed: Libya, the Sahel and Western Sahara.

The trip takes place six weeks before the renewal of the MINURSO mandate.

And on 30 September, Washington received the Polisario.

So what does this meeting mean?

Precision is required, because this is where everything is decided — and because both camps lie a little.

Morocco wants people to believe this meeting means nothing. It speaks of a “manoeuvre”. But you do not call it a manoeuvre to hold talks with a movement you present as non-existent.

Some want people to believe this is a new recognition. That is false too: the recognition of the Polisario as representative of the Sahrawi people dates from 1979, and it was voted through by 85 states.

The truth is simpler, and stronger.

What this meeting means is that Washington now treats the Polisario as what the UN has said it is for forty-seven years: the representative of a people.

Three things show it.

First, who is received. This is not a fringe group that gets ignored. It is the party the General Assembly designated, in 1979, as “the representative of the people of Western Sahara”. You do not receive a representative without recognising, at least implicitly, that he represents someone.

Second, the words used. Waltz does not write “the populations of the South”. He writes: “They deserve real choices, not another decade of waiting.” Real choices — that is, the right to decide. That is the exact vocabulary of self-determination.

Third, the timing. The meeting takes place one month before the renewal of the MINURSO mandate, at the precise moment when the Security Council must decide whether to keep a referendum mission or change its nature.

Putting it all together

[[BAR]]

Sixty years of UN decisions on Western Sahara

1963 | Entry on the list of non-self-governing territories | administering power box empty

1965 | Resolution 2072 (XX): “liberation from colonial domination” | 100 for, 2 against

1966 | Resolution 2229 (XXI): referendum under UN auspices | —

1973 | Creation of the Polisario Front, 10 May | —

!1979 | Resolution 34/37: the Polisario, “representative of the Sahrawi people” | 85 for, 6 against, 41 abst.

1991 | Resolution 690: creation of MINURSO, referendum to be organised | unanimous

!2025 | Resolution 2797: the Moroccan plan “as a basis” — but not exclusive | 11 for, 0 against, 3 abst.

2026 | Washington receives the Polisario, 30 September | —

[[/BAR]]

Let us retrace the chronology, because it is eloquent.

1912: a European power sits down in Fez with a sultan, and decides in his place.

1973: a movement is created in a Spanish colony, and takes as its name the very name of the territory it claims.

1979: the United Nations General Assembly designates that movement as “the representative of the people of Western Sahara”, and asks Morocco to end the occupation. 85 votes against 6.

1991: the Security Council unanimously creates a mission to organise a referendum in which the Sahrawi people would choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

2026: thirty-five years later, the referendum has not taken place. But Washington receives the representative of that people, publishes the photo, and writes that they deserve real choices.

What remains

Morocco did not lose this battle in Washington. It lost it forty-seven years ago, in New York, by 85 votes to 6.

What changed in 2026 is not the law. The law was already written. What changed is that the world's leading power decided to read it aloud.

And meanwhile, the United Nations mission still bears the name of what never happened: referendum.