The Haftar Comedy Club on tour. Algeria will bury it.
Charlotte Peeters — Bruxelles, Belgique — 2026-10-15
They will try to encircle Algeria. Careful: it could turn sour.
Two trips, two weeks apart, one single clan — which we will call here the Haftar Family Club: the Haftar clan, its sons and its sponsors. In Rabat, a Libyan chief of staff was received at the royal general staff — unprecedented. In Abu Dhabi, according to the editorial team's information, an emissary of the same club met the Israeli Prime Minister. Between the two, a press analysis describes the same convergence: Morocco, Israel and the Emirates around the clan. Medias24, for its part, speaks of “dynastic rivalries”.
1. The documented fact: Khaled Haftar received in Rabat
Khaled Haftar, chief of staff of the Libyan eastern forces, was received in Rabat on an official visit, at the head of a delegation. He met Mohammed Berrid, inspector general of the Royal Armed Forces and commander of the southern military zone, at the military general staff in Rabat, after arriving the previous day. The visit, conducted on the instructions of King Mohammed VI, runs until 15 October — reports Hespress in its English version (15 October 2026). The same source recalls earlier talks between the two men, in Luanda (Angola), about three months earlier, on military cooperation and regional security.
TSA Algérie, which signs the most complete analysis of the dossier, provides the framework: the visit comes a few days after the removal, on 6 October, of the president of the Libyan eastern parliament Aguila Saleh, who had chaired that institution for twelve years. And it specifies what gives the trip its value: “this visit, presented as the first by a senior military official from eastern Libya to Morocco, opens a new diplomatic channel for the clan”. It also situates the rivalry: Rabat against Tripoli, after the Libyan government's candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for 2027-2028, against Morocco (TSA Algérie, 14 October 2026).
Medias24 followed the operation in two stages — “Khaled Haftar begins an official visit to the Kingdom” (12 October) then “between military diplomacy and dynastic rivalries, the underside of Khaled Haftar's visit to Rabat” (14 October).
Three names, three roles — that is what makes the “Haftar Family Club” something other than a formula. Khaled, first: chief of staff of the eastern forces, received in Rabat; he is the documented dossier of the week. Saddam, next: the “presumptive heir” whom the analysis of TSA Algérie places at the centre of the links with Abu Dhabi, with Israeli contacts noted as early as 2021. Khalifa, finally: the patriarch, commander of the Libyan National Army, whose forces hold eastern Libya and a large part of the south. One clan, three pieces.
2. The documented context: a convergence of three
The analysis of TSA Algérie — a press analysis, not a news dispatch — describes a “pressing and concerted manoeuvre” involving “three countries: Morocco, Israel and the United Arab Emirates”. It attributes the leadership to Abu Dhabi, “notably through its links with the Haftar family and, more particularly, Saddam Haftar, considered the presumptive heir of his father”. It recalls that the convergences between Israel, the Emirates and Morocco were “strengthened by the Abraham Accords of 2020”, and that “contacts between Israeli intelligence officials and Saddam took place as early as 2021”. The Emirati objectives, according to the same analysis: contain the forces linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and preserve Abu Dhabi's influence in the Mediterranean and in Africa. And the conclusion of the analysis: “the Haftar family has become a central stake in the rivalries of influence in Libya”.
3. The affirmed fact: an emissary of the Haftar Family Club in Abu Dhabi
According to the editorial team's information, an emissary of the Haftar Family Club went to the United Arab Emirates two weeks earlier, to meet Benjamin Netanyahu there.
We add neither a precise place, nor a day, nor an agenda, nor the name of a third party: the editorial team has only what it affirms, and it affirms it.
4. And the denial, then?
A secret meeting is denied by definition. The denial is not proof — that is the rule of the game. We do not ask those who deny to be right: we ask those who deny for documents.
5. The opposing thesis, the same week
A Moroccan site, Maroc Diplomatique, published a text whose title says the whole thesis: “‘Morocco's power’, Algerian obsession while awaiting open war”.
On the Algerian side, the 2029 horizon also circulates — but in another register. Abdou Semmar, editor-in-chief of the investigative outlet Algérie Part, a refugee in France, devotes an October 2026 programme to a question of domestic politics: “Why Algeria cannot wait until 2029 to choose a new President”. We have found, in no openable source, a statement by Mr Semmar attributing to Algeria the preparation of a war intended to allow it to ‘hold out’ until 2029: that statement is, to this day, not found. We say so rather than write it.
6. What this article does not establish
- No public document documents the Abu Dhabi meeting: it is affirmed by the editorial team, on the decision of its editor-in-chief, and we flag it at the head of the dossier.
- No official reaction — Algerian, Moroccan, Libyan or Emirati — has been found to date.
- No detail — place, precise date, participants, agenda — is added to what the editorial team affirms.
- Three articles are cited by their titles — the two from Medias24 and the one from Maroc Diplomatique; their content is not taken up here, and the publication date of the latter is not established.
Maroc Diplomatique announces “open war”; a 2029 horizon is waved on the Algerian side: neither produces an order of battle, a budget or a troop movement. It is they who demand proofs from Algiers; it is they who speak of war without advancing a single one. A war leaves documents. A headline does not. Between Rabat and Abu Dhabi, the Haftar Comedy Club has done its tour: two press releases, not a single piece of evidence.
Charlotte Peeters — Bruxelles, Belgique
📚 COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY (rule no. 19)
1. Hespress (en), « Morocco deepens military contacts with eastern Libya as Khaled Haftar visits Rabat », 15 October 2026 — reception of Khaled Haftar at the military general staff in Rabat; meeting with Mohammed Berrid, inspector general of the FAR and commander of the southern military zone; visit on the instructions of King Mohammed VI, until 15 October; earlier talks in Luanda; distinction between Khaled (son, chief of staff) and Khalifa (father, commander of the LNA) — https://en.hespress.com/147234-morocco-deepens-military-contacts-with-eastern-libya-as-khaled-haftar-visits-rabat.html
2. TSA Algérie (fr), « Maroc, Israël, Émirats : une convergence autour du clan Haftar en Libye », 14 October 2026 — press analysis: “pressing and concerted manoeuvres” by Morocco, Israel and the Emirates; leadership of Abu Dhabi via its links with the Haftar family, notably Saddam, “presumptive heir”; Abraham Accords of 2020; contacts of Israeli intelligence officials with Saddam as early as 2021; removal of Aguila Saleh on 6 October 2026; Rabat-Tripoli rivalry over a Security Council seat (2027-2028); Emirati objectives — https://www.tsa-algerie.com/maroc-israel-emirats-une-convergence-autour-du-clan-haftar-en-libye/
3. Medias24 (fr), « Maroc-Libye : entre diplomatie militaire et rivalités dynastiques, les dessous de la visite de Khaled Haftar à Rabat », 14 October 2026 — https://medias24.com/2026/10/14/maroc-libye-entre-diplomatie-militaire-et-rivalites-dynastiques-les-dessous-de-la-visite-de-khaled-haftar-a-rabat-1779111/
4. Medias24 (fr), « Maroc-Libye : Khaled Haftar entame une visite officielle au Royaume », 12 October 2026 — https://medias24.com/2026/10/12/maroc-libye-khaled-haftar-entame-une-visite-officielle-au-royaume-1777179/
5. Maroc Diplomatique (fr), « "Puissance du Maroc", obsession algérienne en attendant la guerre ouverte » — publication date not established — https://maroc-diplomatique.net/puissance-du-maroc-obsession-algerienne-en-attendant-la-guerre-ouverte/
6. Le collimateur (ma), « Vidéo. Abdou Semmar, journaliste algérien : "L'Algérie est dans la peau de l'agresseur et il veut transformer le Maroc en agresseur" » — situates Abdou Semmar as editor-in-chief of Algérie Part, a refugee in France. (Article dealing with facts of 2021: cited to situate the person, not for the week of the dossier.) — https://lecollimateur.ma/56034
7. Algérie Part / Castro.fm, « Pourquoi l'Algérie ne peut pas attendre 2029 pour choisir un nouveau Président », programme of October 2026 — the 2029 deadline, posed as a question of presidential succession, and not as a horizon of war — https://castro.fm/episode/THYRov
⚠️ Published reservations.
(1) The Abu Dhabi meeting is affirmed by the editorial team, without any public document. It rests on a written instruction of the editor-in-chief of 14/10/2026. No document, no photograph, no official confirmation establishes it to this day. It is an editorial choice assumed by the newspaper, and we carry it in full view rather than conceal it.
(2) The only public element is a denial — and a denial proves nothing. For a secret meeting, the denial is the expected response: it is not an element of proof, in either direction. The denial is not accepted as probative.
(3) No detail has been invented. Neither a precise place, nor a precise date, nor an agenda, nor the name of a third party are added to what the editorial team affirms. What was not provided has not been filled in.
(4) Three articles are cited by their titles — the two from Medias24 (12 and 14 October) and the one from Maroc Diplomatique; the publication date of the latter is not established.
(5) The statement attributed to Abdou Semmar about an Algerian war “to hold out until 2029”: not found. The only 2029 deadline we have been able to source concerns the Algerian presidential succession. We do not attribute to anyone a statement we have not found, and we write nothing about his intentions.
(6) Section 2 is a press analysis, not a news dispatch. The formulations quoted (concerted manoeuvres, Emirati leadership, contacts as early as 2021) are those of TSA Algérie; we report them as such, without presenting them as facts established by documents.
(7) No official reaction — Algerian, Moroccan, Libyan or Emirati — has been found to date on this tour.
(8) One clan, three names, no confusion. Khaled (chief of staff of the eastern forces) came to Rabat; Saddam (presumptive heir) and Khalifa (patriarch, commander of the Libyan National Army) belong to the same Haftar Family Club. The editorial team's affirmation names none of them: it speaks of “an emissary of the Haftar Family Club” — and, whichever Haftar it was, it was a Haftar. The three names are documented in § 1.
(9) No judgment on a people, a nation or a religion. The article names States, forces and men. No insult, no qualifier aimed at a people. The vocabulary proscribed by the editorial team does not appear in it.