Rare Earths, Lithium, Iron: The Treasure Algeria Keeps — and the World Order That Covets It

Karim Mansouri — Alger, Algérie — 2026-09-06

The video doing the rounds on social media — "Algeria: lithium, iron and rare earths" — says a truth many capitals would rather keep quiet: beneath the Algerian Sahara sleep some of the minerals the 21st century is fighting over. But the reality is more impressive still than the slogan. Algeria is not a country discovering its wealth: it is a State that has already identified it, marked out its boundaries — and sovereignly chosen the moment it will open them.

On 9 February 2025, the Council of Ministers chaired by Abdelmadjid Tebboune took a decision few mining powers would dare: for now, to rule out the exploitation of certain rare earths, presented as "a resource destined for future generations." While the whole world scrambles for every available deposit, Algiers locks the treasure away and sets its own terms. That doctrine is written into Act No. 25-12 of 3 August 2025: Algeria's minimum stake in mining projects falls from 51% to 20%, held by a national company — the foreign investor may hold up to 80% of the capital — but never without the State alongside. Openness, yes. A fire sale, never.

To gauge the weight of that stance, look at the market. China produced around 270,000 tonnes of rare earths in 2025 — close to 70% of world output — and controls around 90% of refining, according to the USGS and specialist analyses. Europe, for its part, imports 98% of its permanent magnets and 100% of its heavy rare earths from China, the European Commission acknowledges — having set itself, under its 2024 regulation, the targets of extracting 10%, processing 40% and recycling 25% of its needs by 2030. The International Energy Agency projects magnet demand up 60% by 2030 — and world lithium demand up fivefold by 2040. Neodymium oxide, the sector's benchmark, climbed from 56 to 73 dollars per kilogram between 2024 and 2025, according to the USGS. Every year that passes, Algeria's subsoil is worth a little more.

Iron is where Algeria no longer waits for anyone. The Gara Djebilet deposit, in the far southwest, holds around 3.5 billion tonnes of ore on official figures — North Africa's leading iron deposit. Its primary processing unit, with a capacity of 4 million tonnes per year, came into service in 2026, targeting a concentrate grading 63% iron after dephosphorization. Above all, on 1 February 2026, President Tebboune inaugurated the 950 kilometers of the Béchar–Tindouf–Gara Djebilet mining railway, built in under twenty-four months; the very next day, the first ore was unloaded at Tosyali, in Bethioua near Oran. Rail, mine, steel: the complete chain — free of foreign tutelage.

Phosphate completes the picture: around 2.2 billion tonnes of reserves by the USGS's count, 1.2 billion of them in the single Bled El Hadba deposit, at Tébessa. The first phase of the integrated complex — contracts signed in August 2026 — is to extract 5.5 million tonnes per year to produce 3.2 million tonnes of concentrate. Algeria's mining sector today accounts for around 1% of GDP; the authorities' stated ambition is to lift it to around 5% by 2030. The mines, long the poor relation of the economy, are becoming a pillar of diversification.

And that is where geopolitics walks onto the stage. On the night of 28–29 August 2026, dissident Nigerien soldiers attacked Air Base 101 in Niamey — the site where the Africa Corps contingent is stationed and where, since December 2025, a cargo of around 1,000 tonnes of Nigerien uranium has sat waiting for export. It was the third attack on the base in 2026. Niamey accused Paris of having "incited and sustained" the mutiny — France denies it — but beyond the accusations, the lesson lies elsewhere: resources are no longer mere wealth; they are targets. Whoever wants to control the Sahel's minerals must first destabilize the states that own them.

Algeria's response, however, was on an entirely different scale. As early as 29 August, Algiers condemned the attempt and assured Niamey of its full solidarity. On 30 August, four Algerian Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, escorted by a tanker aircraft, touched down on the besieged base — the Algerian army's first projection beyond its own borders since independence, presented by Algiers as a response to a sovereign request from Niger. In terms of means, Algeria's military budget reached $21.8 billion in 2024 and $25.4 billion in 2025, according to SIPRI — the largest in Africa, or around a quarter of the State's public spending. In terms of doctrine, nothing has moved: no foreign base on Algerian soil, no tutelage, no patron.

At home, the strategy is written on the map. Algeria now counts 69 wilayas — eleven new ones were created in November 2025 — and the Grand South, from In Guezzam to Tamanrasset, has become an economic frontier the State protects: in a single week in June 2026, the People's National Army (ANP) made 531 arrests linked to illegal gold panning in the far south. The Gara Djebilet complex promises 5,000 direct jobs and 20,000 indirect ones, and a 200-megawatt solar plant is to power the site. The wealth of the subsoil will not be plundered: it will be administered, transformed — and paid back in jobs.

Algeria has what the world is searching for — and it has set its own tempo. It keeps its rare earths for its children, opens its iron and phosphate when it is ready, and, to defend it all, commands Africa's largest military budget under a doctrine free of foreign masters. To investors, the message is simple: the country is open — up to 80% foreign capital in the mines — but it is Algiers that decides the moment, the partner and the price. To the preachers of Algeria's weakness, a single piece of advice: look at the map, look at the figures, look at the sky over Niamey. The giant is not asleep: it is choosing its hour.