Abu Dhabi Unmasked: What the Financial Times Documented in August 2026 — Everything Algeria Had Been Denouncing for Two Years

Sarah O’Neill — Liverpool, Royaume-Uni — 2026-09-11

A note on method, to be read before anything else. Every fact in this file carries its source and its link. Every quotation is given in its original language, then translated. We put forward no figure that the reader cannot verify for themselves by clicking. And two Financial Times investigations are accessible only to subscribers: we say so honestly every time, and we quote what third-party media outlets report from them word for word.

On 10 September 2026, Algeria severed its diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates. The same day, le360.ma (Moroccan digital newspaper) ran a headline on "paranoia at the summit" and on Algiers' "morbid obsessions".

A word, then, on paranoia. Paranoia means believing in a threat that does not exist.

Yet a month earlier, the Financial Times published a series of investigations documenting precisely what the Algerian presidency has been denouncing publicly since 2024. A mercenary recruitment network. Military bases. Ports. Stolen gold. And a security company founded by a senior official of the Emirati presidency.

Here is the file, piece by piece.

Exhibit number one — The investigation into the "imperial push"

Financial Times, "The UAE's imperial push into Africa", 3 August 2026.

Link: https://www.ft.com/content/a4c6e5da-dc9f-43b0-a794-c3f6bb9bca7d

Subscriber access. The content below is what third-party media outlets report, each cited with its link.

What the investigation establishes, according to Afrik.com ("Emirates in Africa: what Algiers has been denouncing for two years, revealed by the FT"):

Link: https://www.afrik.com/emirats-arabes-unis-afrique-alger-or-soudanais-ports-mercenaires

  • Since 2017, Emirati entities have announced more than $168 billion in investment in Africa, according to the Financial Times' tally;
  • DP World and AD Ports operate or develop ports, terminals and free trade zones in thirteen countries;
  • companies linked to the Emirates have acquired farmland and mining permits across the continent;
  • Abu Dhabi claims more than $110 billion committed between 2019 and 2023, including more than $70 billion in energy and renewables — which would place it fourth in the world among investors in Africa, behind the United States, China and the European Union.

And this sentence from the Financial Times, reproduced verbatim by Radio Algérienne in its dispatch of 18 August 2026 at 09:46:

Link: https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/92526

"Under the leadership of its authoritarian ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, known as MBZ, this small desert state has deployed investment, influence and military hardware across several regions of Africa at breakneck speed, in a bid to exploit trade and resources for its post-oil future."

The same dispatch was published in English by Radio Algérienne:

Link: https://news.radioalgerie.dz/en/node/92522

And taken up by Le Jeune Indépendant:

Link: http://www.jeune-independant.net/en/2026/08/18/according-to-a-financial-times-investigation-uae-fuels-conflicts-and-destabilizes-african-nations/

By La Nouvelle République (LNR-DZ):

Link: https://www.lnr-dz.com/2026/08/18/les-emirats-alimentent-les-conflits-et-destabilisent-les-pays-africains/

By ENTV, the Algerian public television (in Arabic):

Link: https://www.entv.dz/dz-tif/node/12118

By Africa-Press:

Link: https://www.africa-press.net/gambia/all-news/ft-uae-fuels-conflicts-and-threatens-africas-stability

Exhibit number two — The mercenary network

Financial Times, "The mercenaries fighting in Africa's forgotten war", 14 August 2026, by Katharine Houreld and Justin Lynch.

Subscriber access. We give the exact title, the authors and the date, verified at the source — and we invent no address. Subscribing readers will find it by typing that title on ft.com.

What this article reveals, according to La Nouvelle Tribune:

Link: https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/08/accuses-dambition-imperiale-les-emirats-repondent-dans-le-financial-times/

  • The role of a security company based in the Emirates, the Global Security Services Group (GSSG), in recruiting around 2,000 Colombian mercenaries sent to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan;
  • these fighters are said to have passed through Emirati military bases before being deployed to Nyala and El-Fasher, a city that fell under paramilitary control in October 2025 "in circumstances deemed murderous by the United Nations";
  • the same investigation mentions gold bars stolen from the public refinery in Khartoum, found on Emirati soil for a value exceeding $100 million.

The geography of the network, as the Financial Times describes it, is reproduced word for word by Radio Algérienne:

Link: https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/92526

"A network stretching from Colombia to the UAE, then to Bosaso in Somalia, Al-Kufra in Libya, Nyala and El Fasher in Sudan."

And on the investigative method, the same source specifies:

"The Financial Times gathered the testimonies of former fighters who took part in conflicts in which this network is active. It also consulted travel records, digital data, photographs and other documents linked to this trafficking."

Exhibit number three — The company that calls itself the armed wing of the Emirati State

This is the most serious point in the file, and it is sourced.

According to Middle East Monitor ("Emirati money buys a lot of conscience: How UAE-linked recruiters sent Colombians into Sudan's war", 17 August 2026):

Link: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260817-emirati-money-buys-a-lot-of-conscience-how-uae-linked-recruiters-sent-colombians-into-sudans-war/

  • GSSG was founded in 2016 by Ahmed Mohammed Al-Humairi, secretary-general of the Emirati Presidential Court;
  • the company's website listed the Presidential Court as well as the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior among its clients;
  • GSSG presented itself as "the sole provider of armed private security services to the Emirati government";
  • around 2,000 Colombians traveled to Sudan to support the RSF, some receiving specialized training in drones and anti-aircraft weapons before their deployment;
  • the transit points identified: military facilities in the Emirates, in Libya and in Somalia.

Let us read the third bullet again. A company run by the secretary-general of the Presidential Court, whose website lists the presidency among its clients and which describes itself as the State's private armed provider, recruited mercenaries for an African war.

This is no longer a hypothesis about "private interests". It is a structure of the State.

Exhibit number four — The battalion, the men, and the technical evidence

According to the entry "Desert Wolves" in the Wikipedia encyclopedia, which cites its primary sources:

Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_Wolves

  • the "Desert Wolves" Operations Battalion (Lobos del Desierto) is a mercenary unit made up of retired Colombian military personnel, fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces;
  • it has four companies, between 300 and 400 men; the first company arrived in El Fasher, in North Darfur, in November 2024;
  • the battalion was recruited by private military companies, including the Global Security Service Group in the Emirates, under the coordination of Álvaro Quijano, a retired colonel of the Colombian army;
  • according to Sudan Events, Emirati firms had already deployed former Colombian military personnel in Yemen, in Libya and in Somalia;
  • the mercenaries are said to have been deceived: they believed they were going to secure oil sites.

On the technical evidence, according to Daily Trust ("Foreign contractors complicit in Darfur massacres, Financial Times investigation reveals", 28 August 2026):

Link: https://dailytrust.com/foreign-contractors-complicit-in-darfur-massacres-financial-times-investigation-reveals/

  • the Conflict Insights Group analyzed geolocation data and located Spanish-speaking mobile phones used by the Colombian contractors directly inside El Fasher at the moment the city was falling;
  • these contractors were operating surveillance drones, artillery and anti-aircraft systems;
  • eyewitnesses report having seen foreign men present while RSF fighters were executing civilians in flight on the outskirts of the city;
  • the Emirates categorically deny any involvement, but, as the analysts cited point out, "running multinational recruitment networks and using Emirati training camps would be impossible without de facto approval by the State".

Exhibit number five — Sudan's complaint before the Security Council

Financial Times, "Sudan accuses UAE of sponsoring mercenaries to fight for rebels", 9 September 2025.

Link: https://www.ft.com/content/d4e3613c-dc30-42e8-b7ed-c69a470d6b81

A year before the rupture, the FT reported Sudan's official complaint. The content of the letter is taken up by WorldNews.bg, which reproduces its elements:

Link: https://worldnews.bg/n/sudan-accuses-uae-of-sponsoring-mercenaries-to-fight-for-rebels_506502/

  • Sudan filed a formal complaint before the United Nations Security Council, accusing Abu Dhabi of sponsoring Colombian mercenaries;
  • hundreds of former Colombian military personnel were recruited through two private security companies in the Emirates, according to the letter from Sudan's permanent representative to the UN, dated 5 September 2025;
  • the mercenaries were routed to Sudan via Bosaso, in Somalia's Puntland — where Abu Dhabi has a military base — and via eastern Libya, where the Emirates backed Marshal Haftar;
  • the Sudanese authorities state they have gathered "substantial evidence" of a "systematic action by the Emirates aimed at undermining the peace, the security and the sovereignty of Sudan by financing personnel and deploying mercenaries fighting alongside the RSF".

Exhibit number six — The investigation into the atrocities

Financial Times, "Sudan civil war atrocities cast spotlight on UAE", 3 November 2025.

Link: https://www.ft.com/content/e88e0973-3218-4ce6-a73e-20961c71c33b

Subscriber access. The text can also be consulted through an authorized mirror published by the Savannah Herald:

Link: https://savannahherald.com/sudan-civil-war-atrocities-cast-spotlight-on-uae/

Other Financial Times investigations on the same file, cited here by their title and their date — we invent no address:

  • "A horrific massacre in Sudan" — 6 November 2025;
  • "Sudan government's view of UAE gold heist denials" — 3 September 2026;
  • "The Abu Dhabi royal at the nexus of UAE business and national security" — 25 January 2021 (open access);
  • "The foreign powers competing to win influence in Africa" — 22 August 2024.

Exhibit number seven — The Eritrean testimony

In its August 2026 investigation, the Financial Times gathered the testimony of Eritrea's Minister of Information, Yemane Gebremeskel, cited by Radio Algérienne:

Link: https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/92526

"The problem of the UAE in Africa lies in their unjustified ambition to control the entire region. It began with control over a set of secondary ports across East Africa, but it seems this has evolved into a show of force and an exploitation of resources."

Exhibit number eight — The gold

Again according to Radio Algérienne, citing the Financial Times investigation:

Link: https://news.radioalgerie.dz/fr/node/92526

"According to estimates by the Swiss agency SWISSAID, around $30 billion of artisanal gold is exported each year from Africa to Dubai without being declared."

And according to La Nouvelle Tribune, the FT investigation mentions gold bars stolen from the public refinery in Khartoum, found on Emirati soil, for a value exceeding $100 million:

Link: https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/08/accuses-dambition-imperiale-les-emirats-repondent-dans-le-financial-times/

Exhibit number nine — The Emirates' response: it contests no fact

On 17 August 2026, the Emirates obtained from the Financial Times the publication of a right of reply — a rare move. It is signed by Afra al-Hameli, director of strategic communication at the Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

According to Azernews ("UAE pushes back against FT report on its growing Africa footprint", 18 August 2026):

Link: https://www.azernews.az/region/262527.html

"To describe partnerships negotiated with sovereign African governments as evidence of 'imperial ambition' is deeply patronising."

According to La Nouvelle Tribune, she reproaches the FT for reducing African states to "mere passive recipients of foreign influence", and revisits neither the mercenary network nor the gold trafficking:

Link: https://lanouvelletribune.info/2026/08/accuses-dambition-imperiale-les-emirats-repondent-dans-le-financial-times/

And Cameron Hudson, a former US intelligence official specializing in the African continent, summed up the flaw in that argument on the social network X, according to the same source: mutually profitable investments and strategic ambitions of political control can coexist without contradicting each other.

Exhibit number ten — The United Nations report, three weeks later

On 3 September 2026, a United Nations fact-finding mission made public in Geneva a report on Sudan, reported by Reuters (journalist Olivia Le Poidevin):

Link: https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/09/03/foreign-support-drones-fuel-sudan-war-and-possible-war-crimes-un-probe-says

Also taken up by the Jerusalem Post:

Link: https://www.jpost.com/international/article-907412

Its conclusions:

  • the investigators state they have "reasonable grounds to believe" that a transnational network involving persons and entities located in the United Arab Emirates, in Chad, in Libya and in Somalia, supplied the Rapid Support Forces with weapons, military equipment, logistics, training and foreign personnel;
  • up to 2,000 Colombian contractors are said to have taken part in the operation and maintenance of the RSF's drone systems and other advanced weapons;
  • more than 1,000 people were killed in drone strikes over the first five months of 2026;
  • some of this conduct may constitute war crimes;
  • the Emirates reject these accusations — that is their right, and we report it.

Exhibit number eleven — The context: the rupture of 10 September 2026

The statement from the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published on 10 September 2026, was reproduced in full by L'Espoir Libéré:

Link: https://lespoirlibere.dz/2026/09/10/lalgerie-rompt-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-les-emirats-arabes-unis/

"Faced with the multiplication of provocative or hostile acts on the part of the United Arab Emirates, Algeria has shown great restraint and a high sense of responsibility. […] Despite these numerous warnings, the United Arab Emirates persisted in their actions, which have unfortunately reached the limits of what is admissible or tolerable within the framework of relations between two sovereign states. […] Consequently, and after exhausting all avenues for preserving bilateral relations, the Algerian Government has taken, today, the decision to proceed with the severance of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates."

Confirmed by La Croix:

Link: https://www.la-croix.com/international/l-algerie-rompt-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-les-emirats-arabes-unis-20260910

By Courrier International (citing El-Watan):

Link: https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/diplomatie-l-algerie-annonce-la-rupture-de-ses-relations-diplomatiques-avec-les-emirats-arabes-unis_269697

By Vanguard (AFP dispatch):

Link: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/09/algeria-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-the-uae/

By TSA, which publishes the analysis of former Algerian ambassador Amar Belani:

Link: https://www.tsa-algerie.com/algerie-emirats-arabes-unis-les-cinq-raisons-de-la-rupture/

And the le360.ma editorial that prompted our response — "Paranoia at the Summit", 10 September 2026 at 13:31:

Link: https://fr.le360.ma/monde/paranoia-au-sommet-apres-la-provocation-et-les-insultes-le-regime-dalger-rompt-avec-les-emirats-et_RZFWF5IRQJBUTBX64232L5VUL4/

So who was paranoid?

Let us calmly put the question asked at the outset once more, with every piece of evidence on the table.

What Algeria has said publicly since 2024: that a Gulf "micro-state" is destabilizing the Sahel, Libya and Sudan; that it acts against Algerian interests in our strategic depth; that it offers refuge and protection to those wanted by Algerian justice.

What others have found, with no link whatsoever to Algeria:

  • the Financial Times documented, in August 2026, a mercenary network running from Colombia to Sudan via the Emirates;
  • a security company founded by the secretary-general of the Emirati Presidential Court, presenting itself as the State's private armed wing, recruited 2,000 Colombians trained in drones;
  • Spanish-speaking phones were geolocated inside El Fasher at the moment the city fell;
  • the gold from the Khartoum refinery was found in the Emirates;
  • the Sudanese government filed a complaint before the United Nations Security Council;
  • the UN fact-finding mission named the Emirates;
  • Eritrea's Minister of Information spoke of an "unjustified ambition to control the entire region";
  • $168 billion invested in Africa in nine years, 13 countries covered by two Emirati port operators, and $30 billion of African gold leaving for Dubai without being declared, every year.

A sovereign power that observes this, states it, and draws a diplomatic decision from it is not paranoid. It is clear-sighted, and it is ahead.

We are not saying that Algeria was right because it is Algerian. We are saying that the Financial Times, the Sudanese government, the United Nations investigators and an Eritrean minister documented, each on their own side, what Algiers was announcing out loud.

That is the difference between facts and vocabulary. When you have the facts, you publish investigations. When you do not have them, you write "paranoia".